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Abstract
This study examined the advice networks of venture capital (VC) firms that 
funded new start-up entrepreneurial companies in the high technology sector. Three 
outcomes were associated with VC firms’ funding of start-up companies. Two were 
classified as successful decisions making. These were funding a company until it went 
public with an IPO, was acquired, or merged with an established company and deciding 
to terminate funding a faltering company that would eventually fail after no more than 
two round of funding. The third outcome, which was classified as unsuccessful decision 
making, was funding a faltering company that eventually failed beyond two funding 
rounds. This unsuccessful investment represents the escalation of commitment case.
Characteristics of focal VC firms and the various advice network indices attached 
to their position in the network were used to predict escalation of commitment in new 
start-ups where the first round of funding was between 1990 and 1995. Data for the study 
came from Thompson Financial’s VentureXpert database. The 294 VC firms in this study 
funded 498 new start-ups. When the focal VC firm worked with another VC firm prior to 
1990, that VC firm was part of the focal firm’s advice network. Two different advice 
networks were identified. The first consisted of every VC firm that funded at least one 
round of a particular start-up company. The second was the advice network consisting 
only of the VC firms which funded Rounds 1 or 2. These were the VC firms which made 
the initial decision to continue funding a company that eventually failed and, as a result, 
escalated commitment to a failing course of action.
Three major findings emerged from the study. First, the network of VC firms that 
invest in new high technology start-up companies has become far more interconnected
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and dense over the last 15 or so years. It was not possible to identify regional hubs based 
on VC firm funding ties. Second, the dense interconnections between VC firms allowed 
information to flow freely tbrougbout the network. Some of the network variables and 
characteristics of the VC firms in the advice network were significant predictors of 
escalation of commitment. Third, determining the boundaries of a network and defining 
that network’s membership affected the underlying network structure and thus the results.
IX
Introduction
This dissertation examines escalation of commitment by private equity venture 
capital (VC firms) within the context of their advice networks, specifically, within the 
context of their investing networks. On a theoretical level, this research will contribute to 
the literature on escalation of commitment by being the first large-scale study to examine 
the extent to which the context affects escalation of investment coirmiitment decisions.
When previous decisions result in losses or performance below expectations, the 
decision-makers need to evaluate whether to continue with the course of action. 
Withdrawal behavior usually results when there is repeated, clear, and strong negative 
feedback. A problem arises, however, when the decision whether or not to withdraw from 
the project at a particular decision point in time is not clear-cut. Typically this is because 
the feedback is ambiguous, is negative mixed with positive feedback, or is not perceived 
as unequivocally or strongly negative by the decision-makers. For example, the decision­
makers may interpret a downturn as a surmountable bump in the road that can be 
overcome with additional time, effort, or other resources. The decision-makers can decide 
to continue with their investments, hoping that they can save the situation, or they can cut 
their losses and move on to something else that has a greater chance of success (Bowen, 
1987; McCain, 1986; Northcraft & Wolfe, 1984; Staw, 1976, 1981, 1997). When a 
decision-maker continues a commitment to a failing course of action, the behavior is 
called escalation of commitment (Staw, 1976, 1981, 1997).
It is not just individual decision-makers who escalate: groups and organizations 
do also (Moon, Conlon, Humphrey, Quigley, Devers & Nowakowski, 2003; Whyte, 
1993). Escalation by venture capital syndicate groups has previously been documented
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(Birmingham, Busenitz & Arthurs, 2003; De Clerc, 2002; Gompers & Lerner, 1999; 
Guler, 2003; Ryan, 1994, 1995; Steiner & Greenwood, 1995; Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000; 
Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001).
While previous studies have documented escalation of commitment hy individual 
venture capitalists and venture capital syndicates, little research explores the context of 
this escalation process. These investment decisions do not take place in a vacuum. The 
context in which individuals, groups and organizations are embedded influences the 
decision process (Moscovici & Doise, 1994; Chernyshenko, Miner, Baumann & Sniezek, 
2003; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995).
One context receiving research attention recently has heen the network of 
relationships in which the individual, group or organization is embedded (McDonald & 
Westphal, 2003; Elfring & Hulsink, 2003; Uzzi, 1996, 1999). Influence hy network ties 
on focal individuals, groups, and organizations has heen documented in other contexts. 
Both the location of the focal actor in the tie network and the information and advice 
flowing between ties has been shown to influence behavior (Hurlhert, Haines & Beggs, 
2000; Elfring & Hulsink, 2003). No studies, however, have explored the influence of 
network ties on escalation of commitment. This study will he the first to examine the 
influence of venture capitalist advice networks on escalation of conmiitment.
Venture capitalists are an ideal population for studying advice networks and 
escalation of commitment. Venture capital (VC) firms generally invest in projects with 
other VC firms as a VC syndicate. These syndicates make repeated investments in a 
project over time. As a result, there is the potential for venture capitalists to escalate their 
commitment if  the project is struggling. In order to he successful venture capitalists must
be able to both recognize that they are escalating their commitment to a project and 
prevent themselves from escalating. Venture capitalists rely on their advice networks 
when they make initial investment decisions (Gompers & Lerner, 1999), and it is likely 
that their advice network also influences other aspects of their decision-making. When, 
for example, a focal VC firm has a large number of ties to other successful VC firms, the 
focal VC firm may learn vicariously how not to escalate. Network research has 
documented the existence of venture capitalist networks and influences between these 
and other related network ties with regards to funding and assisting entrepreneurs 
(Sorenson & Stuart, 2001; Yli-Renko & Altio, 1998), IPO investment bankers, and IPO 
underwriters (Gompers & Lerner, 1999). No research, however, has examined the effects 
of these networks on escalation of commitment.
This dissertation will make theoretical contributions to VC literature in several 
areas. In this study, escalation of commitment is examined within an environmental 
context salient for VC firms, namely their investing networks with other VC firms. This 
study will be the first to look at the effects of the focal firm’s social, or advice, network 
on escalation of commitment. The examination of advice networks’ influence on 
decision-making and escalation of commitment will also contribute to the literature on 
social networks.
This research will also make a contribution to practitioners. Venture capital is one 
of the few funding sources for high-risk, high-technology start-up companies (Gompers 
& Lerner, 1999, 2001; By grave & Timmons, 1992; Guler, 2003; De Clerc, 2002). 
Venture capitalists invest billions of dollars in new ventures— over 60 billion dollars in 
2001—but only about a third of the investments are ultimately successful (Gompers &
Lerner, 2001). The rest result in either a complete or partial loss of the investment. 
Helping venture capitalists find ways to make better decisions, including bailing from a 
failing start-up without escalating, will increase profits for VC firms and their investors 
by decreasing their losses.
Chapter two will review the existing literature on escalation of commitment as 
relevant to VC firm escalation and networks, review the relevant literature on social 
networks and groups, and propose how the later might affect the former. The hypotheses 
will be developed and presented. Chapter three, the research methods chapter, will 
discuss the operationalization of the variables, data, and data analyses to be used. The 
data comes from Thompson Financial’s VentureXpert database of venture capital firm 
investments in new start-up companies. This dataset includes investment partners, dates 
of investments, amounts invested, and company outcomes. From this information an 
advice network will be created, based on who invested with whom. Social network 
analysis, which gives a variety of information about network ties between nodes of 
interest (in this case VC firms), will be used to create the data for the advice network 
variables. Regression will then be used to look for relationships between the advice 
network variables and escalation of commitment. Chapter four will present the research 
results, and chapter five will discuss the study’s results, limitations, and the theoretical 
and practical applications of this research to venture capital decision-making.
Review of Literature
This study examines the influence of venture capitalists’ advice networks on 
escalation of commitment to start-up companies. It proposes that a number of advice 
network variables do, in fact, influence the propensity to escalate commitment to a failing
project. This chapter reviews the relevant literature on escalation of commitment and 
social networks. The model proposed and tested is based on the Staw (1997) model of 
escalation of commitment. This model includes escalation factors both internal and 
external to the project. While Staw did not explicitly include advice networks in his 
model, the network variables would be included under the “contextual determinants” 
portion of the model (see Figure 3.1).
Background Information on Escalation of Commitment
Escalation of commitment is a multi-staged process. Decision-makers often 
expend a significant “due diligence” effort before initially deciding to commit resources 
to a venture. Once the initial decision to invest is made, however, they tend to become 
overly committed to the venture, ignoring or putting a positive spin on new information 
that is ambiguous or negative. As a result, the decision-makers can get caught in a 
downward spiral that culminates in escalation of commitment to a failing course of action 
(Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1976). Individuals, groups, and organizations can all get trapped 
in such a losing course of action (Staw, 1997; Brockner, 1992).
Brocker (1992) and Staw (1976, 1981) describe the escalation of commitment 
process. The first step is deciding to commit resources to a venture where, although there 
is some uncertainty about the outcome, the decision-maker believes the outcome will be 
favorable. The second step is viewing new information that is either ambiguous or 
negative about the project either with a positive spin or as a temporary setback. The third 
step is continuing to invest, despite increasingly more negative information, in what 
ultimately becomes a failed course of action.
Venture capitalists investing in start-up companies provide a good context to 
study escalation of commitment. They repeatedly allocate resources over time to start-up 
companies believing the final outcome will he positive, even though there is no way to he 
absolutely certain. Venture capitalists frequently encounter temporary setbacks, even 
with ultimately successful ventures. There are significant risks involved when funding 
new start-ups. On average, at least 30% of the companies invested in fail and another 
30% do not make the VC firm any money (Guler, 2003). Resource allocations involve 
repeated decisions to reinvest, called financing rounds; at any point one or all of the VC 
firms involved could decide to withdraw from the investment. Venture capitalists 
typically invest in groups called syndicates, which are limited-life legal entities made up 
of VC firms jointly funding a start-up entrepreneurial company. Since VC firms invest 
repeatedly in a large number of companies, there is, theoretically, the opportunity to learn 
from experience, which presumably would include learning to recognize failing 
investments early on (Guler 2003).
Ross and Staw (1993) have suggested that “perhaps those who work in 
occupations in which escalation is a routine problem may be socialized to avoid excess 
persistence” (p. 724). Unfortunately this statement has been demonstrated to he untrue, 
even with experienced venture capitalists (Shepherd, Zacharakis, & Baron, 2003).
A market perspective would suggest that market mechanisms would select out 
inefficient VC firms. Under this scenario, little escalation of commitment should occur 
amongst more experienced firms because VC firms that escalate and do not leam from 
experience should go out of business. But this is not always the case (Guler, 2003; De 
Clerc, 2002; Shepherd et al., 2003). Indeed, at least six studies have documented that VC
syndicate groups do escalate (Birmingham et ah, 2003; Guler, 2003; De Clerc, 2002; 
Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001; Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000; Ryan, 1994,1995; Gompers & 
Lerner, 1999).
Other factors affect venture capitalists’ decision-making process. Overconfidence 
hy decision-makers contrihutes to escalation behavior. In a process that depends on the 
amount of information available, venture capitalists suffer from overconfidence in their 
decisions, which leads to poor decisions (Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001). Venture 
capitalists may ignore incoming information when making additional financial round 
investments (Guler, 2003). Given that paying attention to new information helps 
individuals de-escalate (Ross & Staw, 1993), failure to do so contrihutes to escalation of 
commitment. The size of the syndication group, as well as adding or subtracting a venture 
capitalist from the group, also affects escalation (Birmingham et ah, 2003).
Escalation of commitment has heen documented in groups in laboratory studies 
(Moon et ak, 2003; Whyte, 1993; Bazerman, Giuliano & Appleman, 1984). One major 
finding is that when group members have given individual consideration to their decision 
before the group makes a collective decision; both the individual members and the entire 
group are more prone to suffer from decision biases and to continue their commitment. In 
addition, the group’s decision tends to fall between individual members’ extreme 
opinions (Moon et ak, 2003). Both De Clerc (2002) and Guler (2003) have documented 
that venture capitalists generally continue funding when feedback is ambiguous. Since 
they are used to having temporary setbacks during funding periods, they often view initial 
negative or ambiguous feedback as indications of problems that can he overcome rather
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than as signals that the new company should he terminated (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992; 
De Clerc, 2002; Guler, 2003; Gompers & Lerner, 1999).
Venture capitalists certainly would enter the decision to fund another round 
having thought ahout it in advance. With incremental decision-making, like the decision 
to grant another round of funding, where the outcome is to fund or not to fund, few 
compromise or integrative decision outcomes are possible. As a result, when there is not 
complete agreement within the syndicate, the fund/don’t fund decision becomes a 
compromise one of funding less money more frequently (De Clerc, 2002; Guler, 2003). 
This may explain the finding of Birmingham et al (2003) that escalating venture 
capitalists tended to grant less money to a company each round with less time between 
rounds of funding. Thus, in a VC syndicate, the group may he more likely to fund than to 
terminate, leading to escalation. While larger VC syndicates are more prone to escalation, 
adding or subtracting a venture capitalist from the group investing over the life of the 
company actually decreases escalation. This is probably because a VC firm added to later 
rounds of funding would not choose to invest if  their due diligence indicated existing 
problems were insurmountable and the added attention given to negative information 
when a VC firm leaves the group (Birmingham et ak, 2003).
Moving from a market to a behavioral perspective gives another view. The 
behavioral perspective attempts to explain why escalation happens and what might he 
done in order to minimize this tendency. The behavioral decision-making literature 
presents evidence that decision-makers do deviate from rationality and that decision 
errors are systematic, not random (De Clerc, 2002; Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000).
Early behavioral escalation research was primarily experimental laboratory 
research. Several researchers have documented that students will pay more money than 
something is worth when they become overly committed to winning or to a goal that they 
are failing to obtain (Teger, 1980; Brokerner & Ruhin, 1985). In addition, Arkes & 
Blumer (1985) demonstrated that as people invest more in a project they are more likely 
to continue their commitment until the project is completed.
Other laboratory experiments and field studies examined the behavior of decision­
makers when the economic information was the same across conditions. Personal 
responsibility for the earlier investment decision, whether in the laboratory (Staw, 1976) 
or in the field (Staw, Koput, & Barsade, 1997), affected whether the decision-maker 
would escalate. In one of the earliest studies, Staw (1976) found that those who were 
responsible for an earlier investment decision that resulted in losses invested more in the 
next investment round than those who were not. In addition, those who made the original 
decision to invest were far more likely to reinvest than to terminate a failing project. In a 
field study using hank managers, Staw et ai. (1997) documented that when there was a 
change in hank managers, new managers who were not personally responsible for 
granting the original loan were more likely to write off had loans as compared to those 
responsible for granting the initial loan.
Escalation does not occur under ail conditions, however. When there is repeated, 
strong negative feedback, decision-makers will terminate a project. Decision-makers are 
less likely to escalate when complete information, including the probabilities of future 
outcomes for various decision choices, is available (Bowen, 1987; Northcraft & Wolfe, 
1984). Brockner & Ruhin (1985) documented that giving decision-makers full
information prior to making their initial decision had an effect on the decision made. This 
is consistent with how venture capitalists decide to invest in a start-up. Venture capital 
firms do due diligence before they decide to invest and often come to the conclusion not 
to invest. Brockner & Rohin (1985) found conversely that full information given out after 
resources were committed had no affect on future reinvestment decisions. Venture 
capitalists also ohtain more information after making their initial investment, such as the 
start-up missing targets or other unanticipated problems. As a result, there is potential for 
venture capitalists to he influenced hy the same processes that Brockner & Rohin (1985) 
documented.
Three explanations for escalation of commitment behavior have received support. 
The first is that the decision-maker continues to invest to avoid cognitive dissonance 
(Brownstein, 2003; Rosenfeld, Kennedy & Giacalone, 1986; Staw, 1976; Festinger,
1957). Experimentally, both groups and individuals feel pressure to justify previous 
decisions (Bazerman et ak, 1984). Whyte (1993) found that groups escalated their 
commitment even more than individuals did. On the other hand, Leatherwood and 
Conlon (1988) found that the ability of groups to diffuse responsibility helped them 
escalate less than individuals. In this experiment, however, individuals had no opinions 
on what the decision should he prior to being presented with the decision that needed to 
be made— a context not relevant to the VC decision situation. If some group members 
wanted to abandon a project and others wanted to continue, the group members must 
reconcile their opinions, something that is not always easy (Wittenhaum & Park, 2001; 
Jehn, Northcraft & Neale, 1999; Stasser, 1992). In the VC setting, a VC firm does have 
the option to drop out. One consequence of dropping out is that the VC firm’s holdings,
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and therefore the potential return on its investment, will be diluted by later-round 
investors. In addition, venture capitalists tend to pressure each other to continue funding, 
since to completely cut off funding guarantees that the project will fail and the money 
invested will be lost (Gompers & Lerner, 1999; De Clerc, 2002). In reconciling opinions, 
some individuals may not share information known only to them that contradicts their 
personal decision preference (Jehn, Northcraft & Neale, 1999; Wittenhaum & Park, 
2001). In addition, because groups tend to pay more attention to information all group 
members have in common, conflicting information known only by a few individuals may 
be ignored (Stasser, 1992).
The second explanation for escalation behavior is that the decision-maker 
continues to invest because of cognitive limitations (Rosenfeld, Kermedy & Giacalone, 
1986; Edwards, 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Shepherd, Zacharakis & Baron (2003) have 
documented how venture capitalists’ cognitive limits lead them to use heuristics and 
cognitive shortcuts when they make investment decisions. Network contacts are used as 
cognitive shortcuts in information searches; when searching for information, the searcher 
tends to gather more information from trusted individuals than from using all reputable 
sources available (Reagans & McEvily, 2003; Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001).
The third explanation for escalation of commitment behavior is based on how 
heuristics and biases affect the decision-making process (Whyte, 1993; Bazweman, et. 
ak, 1984; Tver sky & Kahneman, 1974). Tver sky & Kahneman (1974) have documented 
how decision-makers respond to framing, which is known as prospect theory. When 
something is “loss framed,” or framed and perceived as a loss, decision-makers are 
willing to take larger risks to try to recoup that loss than when the identical situation is
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given a positive, “gain-framed” spin. An individual’s existing opinion biases the 
information search process such that information that supports the position is that which 
is most likely to he used. In addition, ambiguous information is interpreted as supporting 
the position held (Pinkley, Griffith, & Northcraft, 1995). Also, perceived responsibility 
for the decisions leads to self-justification which leads to higher levels of escalation 
(O’Connor, 1997).
Brockner (1992), testing these and competing categories of explanations for 
escalation behavior, found that these theories together, rather than individually, provided 
the best explanatory power. His main finding was that self-justification theory was 
important but could not stand alone. On the individual level of analysis, both expectancy 
theory and prospect theory provided explanatory power. On the interpersonal and group 
levels, group polarization, self-presentation theory, and modeling processes all 
contributed. At the organizational level, organizational inertia was important. He also 
found that these various theories had differing explanatory power depending on the 
decision-maker’s existing commitment to the project. He concluded that escalation and 
its antecedents needed to be examined longitudinally.
Most behavioral research on escalation of commitment has been laboratory 
experiments or case studies. The findings, although robust, have been criticized for over­
reliance on experimental laboratory research that has limited external validity (Staw, 
1997). Another problem is that people, groups, and organizations do not make decisions 
in a vacuum, but instead are influenced by social, enviromnental/contextual, political, 
and, in the case of individuals and groups, organizational forces. This was clearly
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documented in a case study concerning the spectacular and expensive Shoreham Nuclear 
Power failure (Ross & Staw, 1993).
General Model o f Escalation o f Commitment
Escalation of commitment research has heen criticized for its lack of theoretical 
direction or limits. This is partly due to the many forces that come together to create 
conditions ripe for escalation behavior and, for a long time, no theoretical framework for 
considering all the variables studied (Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1997).
Ross & Staw (1987, 1989, 1993) proposed a classification scheme for existing 
escalation of commitment variables. Their proposed conceptual model integrated past 
research and escalation explanations. Using the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant failure, 
they tested and then refined a multi-level temporal model for the escalation of 
commitment process. (Ross & Staw, 1993; Staw, 1997) Their final model (see Figure 
2.1), a portion of which will he used in this research, includes five categories of variables: 
project, psychological, social, organizational, and environmental/contextual determinant 
variables (Ross & Staw, 1993; Staw, 1997).
The first category is project determinants related to the financial outcomes of the 
investment and broader economic concerns. Escalation of commitment is more likely if 
the setback is temporary, further investment might turn the situation around, the size of 
the payoff or goal is large, the level of expenditure needed to increase the project is high 
and the rewards are very important, few alternatives are available, withdrawing would 
bankrupt the firm, or the salvage value of the ended project would he low.. All of these 
project determinants and conditions are consistent with the kinds of projects venture 
capitalists fund.
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The second category of variables includes psychological determinants, which are 
the psychological factors making it harder for people to pull the plug at the first signs of 
trouble. Ross & Staw (1987, 1989,1993) considered four factors to be most important.
The first psychological factor is optimism and the illusion of control. Although 
decision-makers are likely to consider their economic projections as accurate or unbiased, 
in fact economic data are neither objective nor are decision-makers unbiased in 
evaluating economic data. Decision-makers often are optimistic, overestimating the 
likelihood of positive events and underestimating the likelihood of negative events. They 
suffer from the illusion of control, believing that they will have better outcomes than 
others due to their skills. Therefore, similar to “winner’s curse”, decision-makers believe 
that with their experience and skill they can influence the odds in their favor and bring 
risks under their control. This biasing of information affects the initial decision to invest 
(Shnv,1997).
The second psychological factor, information bias, also influences decisions made 
beyond the initial funding level or funding round. As documented in self-justification 
theory, decision-making is a psychologically binding act causing attitude and belief 
changes. Decision-makers reduce cognitive dissonance by changing their attitudes and 
beliefs to those consistent with the decision made (Festinger, 1957; Staw, 1997).
,Needing to rationalize or justify their earlier decisions, decision-makers personally 
responsible for the initial decision to invest coiumitted more resources than those not 
initially responsible for the decision to a losing course of action (Staw, 1976; Brocker, 
1992). In addition, this responsibility for a losing course of action also affects the search 
for information and the evaluation of this information. Decision-makers were more likely
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to look for information that supported their initiai decision and to interpret any new 
information in a light most positive to or consistent with their previous decision (Staw, 
1997; Staw, Koput, & Barsade, 1997; Bazerman, Giuiiano & Appieman, 1984).
The third psychological factor is sunk costs. Although these costs should he 
ignored, many decision-makers in fact take these costs into account in making investment 
decisions (Staw, 1997). When projects are nearly done, even in the face of very negative 
information, sunk costs are generally routinely not ignored and more money is allocated 
to finish the project (Garland, 1990; Arkes & Biumer, 1985).
The framing effect is the last psychological factor. Kahneman & Tver sky (1979) 
documented how cognitive framing affects people’s risk perception and subsequent 
behavior. When a situation is presented in a positive frame, people are risk adverse. The 
opposite is true when a situation is presented in negatively framed way. In the escalation 
context, negative feedback about a project creates a loss frame. If  committing more 
resources to a project may turn it around, people are more likely to do so to avoid the 
certain loss of terminating the project (Staw, 1997).
Social determinants, the third category identified by Staw & Ross (Ross & Staw, 
1993; Staw, 1997), are often overlooked in escalation of commitment research. The 
context in which decisions are made— including organizational context, ongoing personal 
relationships, and the constituents of the decision process— affect decision outcome. 
Similar to individual justification and decision binding, these may take place in a context 
external to the decision-maker (Staw, 1997). Terminating a failing project can he 
personally costly in an organization because it can he interpreted as an admission of 
personal failure. When decision-makers make decisions with potentially personally
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negative outcomes, they are motivated to try to turn the situation around (Fox & Staw, 
1979). In an organization there are social rewards for persistence. Saving a failing project 
can mean that positive attributes are attributed to the leader. Leaders who were perceived 
as consistent were rated more positively than those who were not. Those who were 
consistent and turned a failing situation around received the highest evaluations (Staw & 
Ross, 1980). This tendency to rewarding for persistence can be a significant motivating 
factor for a decision-maker to stick with an initial decision, rather than pulling the plug 
on a failing project.
The last two categories in Staw & Ross’s model (Ross & Staw, 1993; Staw, 1997) 
are organizational and contextual, or environmental, determinants. Organizational 
determinants are a product of social interactions; as such, they are a more macro-level set 
of variables. Institutional inertia, political problems and resistance, and product 
identification all affect the ability of decision-makers to withdraw from a situation even if 
their private preference is to do so (Staw, 1997). Contextual determinants are 
organizations or political processes and pressures external to the focal organization which 
can affect its ability to act. These environmental factors also can affect escalation of 
commitment (Staw, 1997).
The temporal model developed by Staw (1997) reflects the facts that some forces 
may not be activated until certain conditions are present and that conditions may change 
over time. When things deteriorate slowly, behavioral sources of commitment become 
important. When things go wrong quickly, it is easier for organizations and individuals to 
exit because fewer forces act on them to continue their commitment. Ross & Staw’s 
model, which was partly supported, and later modified, by the Shoreham Nuclear Power
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Plant failure case study, is as follows: Project economics are filtered though individual 
biases and result in perceived project economies which form the hasis for individuals, 
groups, or organizations to commit to a course of action. The decision-makers’ 
commitment is influenced hy psychological, social, organizational, and contextual 
determinants. These determinants, in turn, influence biases, which serve to further 
influence commitment to the course of action. [See Figure 2.1]. Within the context of this 
model, this research will he examining some of the social determinants, in this case the 
networks of the venture capitalists, of escalation of commitment hy venture capital firms 
(Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3).
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Figure 2.1
Staw (1997) model
Project bconomics
i
Blases
Perceived proiect economics
i
Commitment to a course o f action
î
Psychological Social* Organizational* Contextual*
Determinants Determ inants Determ inants Determ inants
*  == Determinants of interest in this study (venture capitalist advice network)
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Research Model
This study will examine the influence o f the characteristics of the venture 
capitalist advice network, which function as a social, contextual and organizational 
determinant, on escalation of commitment. This provides a finer-grained overlay to the 
Staw model (1997) which further delineates influences on escalation of commitment. The 
following temporal model is proposed (see Figure 2.2 for the complete model and Figure 
2.3 for the model component being tested):
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Figure 2.2
Temporal Model o f  Social Network Effects on Escalation o f Commitment by VC Firms
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Figure 2.3
Model of Social Network Effects on Escalation of Commitment by VC Firms 
(Model testing, expansion of relevant part of Figure 3.2)
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The figures illustrate an iterative model of the effects of social, contextual and 
organizational determinant components—the social networks of VC firms, syndicates, 
and the larger industry in which they are embedded— on escalation of commitment. The 
VC firm is embedded in several different networks which are nested within each other, 
all of which influence each other and project outcomes. Resources, information, and 
advice all flow through interfirm or syndicate ties. The egocentric networks, i.e., the 
direct ties the VC firm or the syndicate’s firms have, of individual VC firms or syndicates 
differentially affect the VC firms’ or syndicates’ access to advice, information, and 
resources.
An individual VC firm partnering with another VC firm gains access to the 
partner’s network relationships and information flows, like water through a pipe, through 
these network ties. All ties are not, however, created equal. A tie to a well-connected, 
experienced VC firm specializing in the same industry and stage of investment’ would 
probably mean that the focal VC firm would have access to better advice, information, 
suggestions, resources, and potential partners than a tie to a VC firm that is 
inexperienced, funds companies in a different industry, or is more interested in funding 
late-stage rather than new companies. The skill sets of venture capitalists who are 
inexperienced, specialize in a different industry, or specialize in late stage funding are 
probably different than the skill set of venture capitalists in the former group. As a result, 
venture capitalists in the later group probably have less to offer in terms of directly useful 
advice.
The position of a VC firm in the larger industry-wide network affects its options 
as well. Poorly connected peripheral actors, for example, have less power and access to
' This would be the early stage in the case of this research.
2 2
resources than those who are densely, centrally located. As syndicates form and dissolve 
over time, as new venture capitalists enter or leave the industry, as individuals move from 
one VC firm to another or open their own firms, as individuals and syndicates are 
successful or unsuccessful and thus become desirahle or undesirable partners, the 
configuration of all these nested networks changes.
Social networks’ variables and configurations, as social, contextual and 
organizational determinants, affect commitment to a course of action. These networks, 
individually or together, influence biases and perceived project economics.
Interpretations of events, “facts”, and other information are often socially constructed. 
Over time, cohesive groups— in this case, syndicates— often come to hold similar 
opinions and beliefs. As a result, those with whom an actor is tied can affect biases and 
perceptions. When the actor is acting on their perceptions then they affect the particular 
decision made.
This research does not assess biases or perceived project economics on the basis 
of secondary data only. The link between networks and the course of action is examined 
with the intermediate step of perceptions and biases removed, as represented in the model 
in Figure 2.2 by the dark broken arrow that goes from the contextual dimension box to 
the course of action box through the perceived project economics box.
Once a fund or exit course of action has been decided upon, venture capitalists 
then need to decide how much to fund and when to fund, or, if  the decision is to exit, how 
to exit. One timely or correct exit decision is an IPO/merger exit. A second is to terminate 
failing companies early on. An untimely or incorrect exit decision is to terminate late in
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the game after investing in many rounds of funding, which is the escalation of 
commitment scenario.
If the decision is to exit, regardless of exit timing, the reputation of the VC firm 
and its ability to raise money for further projects may he affected. The stakes are high, 
particularly in the case of a new VC firm funding its first project. If the venture is 
successful, the new firm will find it easier to raise money in the future. If  the venture is 
not successful, the firm may experience negative consequences, including extreme 
difficulty in raising additional funds and the potential reluctance of others to syndicate on 
future projects. The new firm may potentially end up as an isolate, with no links to any 
other firm, or even drop out of the network entirely. On the other hand, when a highly 
experienced VC firm has a failed investment, it has other successes to soften the hlow of 
failing; in addition, it benefits from the industry expectation that some failures are to he 
expected.
The history of a VC firm’s success or failure affects its partnership opportunities 
and ultimately its position in the overall network. With repeated failures, a VC firm will 
probably find that it becomes progressively more peripheral in the overall industry-wide 
network, that the size of its egocentric networks decreases, and that any new ties are with 
VC firms even more poorly placed in the larger industry-wide network. As a result, the 
focal firm has progressively less access to “good” advice from network partners. The 
reverse would he true for firms with more successes and increasingly better reputations. 
Ultimately, the environment in which a VC firm is embedded will be changed by this 
cycle. Therefore, it should he possible to predict escalation based on the VC firm’s 
demographics, including variables such as firm age and experience, track record, and
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industry and funding stage specialization, as well as individual VC firm network 
characteristics. The result is a dynamic model where the advice network of the VC firm 
influences the quality of advice a VC firm receives and, ultimately, whether a VC firm or 
syndicate escalates its commitment to a failing course of action.
Venture Capitalists’ Demographics and Escalation o f Commitment
In studying venture capitalists, Guler (2003) found that their reinvestment 
decisions were affected hy individual biases, the structure of the investment and re­
investment process, co-investor pressure, and the limited life of the fund. The result was 
that reinvestment decisions were not consistent with what would he expected under 
normative decision-making processes. While there was little difference between the 
ability of venture capitalists to manage and make rational reinvestment decisions for 
successful companies, the same was not true for their ability to terminate failing 
companies (Guler, 2003). VC firms that had more experience and fewer surplus financial 
resources were better at terminating failing investments than other experienced or 
inexperienced VC firms (Guler, 2003).
By itself, the experience level of a venture capitalist is not enough. Shepherd, 
Zacharakis, & Baron (2003) found that additional experience improved inexperienced 
venture capitalists’ decision-making processes up to a point. Beyond a certain level of 
experience, however, the researchers documented decreased reliability and performance. 
They concluded that the more experience a venture capitalist has may not translate into 
better decisions. Shepherd et al. (2003) documented that venture capitalists’ decision 
accuracy increased over time, with decision accuracy peaking at 12-15 years of 
experience. After this time period, good decision-making decreased somewhat. The
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explanation for these findings, the researchers suggested, was that inexperienced venture 
capitalists faced information overload, had a poor understanding of the all the complex 
factors involved in start-up success, and did not understand how these factors related to 
success, hut experience helped them acquire an increasingly better understanding of these 
factors. Unfortunately, after 12-15 years of experience, venture capitalists tended to rely 
more on heuristic-influenced information processing hased on past successes rather than 
on factors specifically relating to the new venture. Using heuristic-hased or other 
automatic processing hased models of decision-making such as mental short cuts or rules 
of thumh helped them become more efficient in quickly screening proposals or 
identifying problems. However, it also meant that they were often less systematic and 
less able to articulate explicitly how they evaluated proposals or identified potential 
problems early on in the life of their investment. As a result, these experienced venture 
capitalists may he less able to give specific advice to others about how they make 
decisions and prohlem-solve.
Based on Shepherd et al.’s (2003) findings, it may be that VC firms with direct 
ties to very experienced VC firms may actually get less concrete decision-making and 
problem-solving advice than if their ties were to VC firms with somewhat less 
experience, due to the tendency of these more experienced venture capitalists to be able 
to give less specific advice. On the other hand, ties with other young VC firms would 
result in less likelihood of good advice due to the young firms’ lack of experience.
Advice from venture capitalists with 12-15 years experience may he the most valuable.
De Clerc (2002) found that it was a venture capitalist’s knowledge of a specific 
industry and previous investment history that affected future outcomes. These results
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were attributed to the added value a venture capitalist brings to an entrepreneurial 
company with regards to VC oversight, involvement with entrepreneur’s strategic 
decisions, connections, and credibility. Experience in the industry increases what a 
venture capitalist brings to the table in terms of assistance to an entrepreneurial company 
(De Clerc 2002; De Clerc, et.ah, 2001; Gupta & Sapienza, 1992). Clearly knowledge 
overlap is important. With strategic alliance and knowledge generation research, 
researchers have documented that the greater the knowledge overlap, or absorptive 
capacity, between the parties, the greater the depth of the learning and new knowledge 
creation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). One logical extension would be that when VC firms 
are specialists investing in, or in a network with others who are specialists in, the same or 
closely related industry, the VC syndicate is better able to recognize subtle problems and 
nip them in the bud, as compared to networks and syndicates where the venture 
capitalists have more diverse backgrounds. Another logical extension is that a VC firm’s 
level of social capital, along with the benefits that are acquired from repeated 
investments, are what the experienced venture capitalists use to both manage successful 
investments and recognize failing investments. As a result, what may be important is not 
experience per se, but rather the specifics of a VC firm’s experience. An experienced 
venture capitalist with a deep knowledge of the investment’s industry or fewer 
investments that resulted in escalation of commitment may give more valuable advice 
than an experienced venture capitalist in another industry or with a poorer record of 
controlling escalation.
Taken together these literatures suggest the following hypotheses:
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Hypothesis la: VC firms connected to primarily inexperienced or very
experienced VC firms will escalate more than those with a higher 
percentage of connections to VC firms with 12-15 years of 
experience.
Hypothesis lb: Syndicates with more VC firms with more industry relevant
experience will escalate less than those with less past experience in 
that industry.
Hypothesis Ic: Syndicates with at least one VC firm with 12-15 years experience
with fewer escalation outcomes and more experience in the 
industry of investment will escalate less.
Background Information on Social Networks
The success of a new company is not just dependent upon the quality of the 
entrepreneur’s idea. As documented by social network research, entrepreneurs who are 
funded hy well connected venture capitalists have preferential access to resources, 
people, and institutions that contribute both to the success of the venture and to a higher 
IPO valuation (Cable & Shane, 1997; Gompers & Lerner, 1999). However, social 
network research in the venture capital/entrepreneurial arena has had a limited focus to 
date. A mapping of connections between venture capitalists shows that venture capitalists 
are clustered in a limited number of areas in the United States, with the largest 
concentrations in the Silicon Valley area of California and along the Route 128, or 
greater Boston, area of Massachusetts (Bygrave, 1987; Bygraves & Timmons, 1992). In 
addition, wherever there are clusters of venture capitalists, there tend to be clusters of 
entrepreneurs and start-ups (Bygrave, 1987; Bygrave & Timmons, 1992; De Clerc, 2002; 
Gompers & Lerner, 1999).
Staw’s (1997) model of escalation of commitment includes psychological, social, 
organizational, and contextual determinants. Although not discussed in the escalation of
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commitment literature, the social networks in the VC firm should influence these 
determinants at a variety of levels of analysis. VC firms are embedded in a larger venture 
capitalist network. The existence of these advice and investment networks has been 
documented by several researchers (Castilla, 2003; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001; Bygrave, 
1987; Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). Venture capitalists ask trusted others in their network 
for their opinion of new ventures. If  they decide to invest, they generally syndicate the 
investment with other trusted VC firms from their network whom they have relied on for 
advice or co-invested with in the past (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). These social networks 
form a salient part of a VC firm’s social environment and influence its investment 
decisions. As such, they should influence the propensity of venture capitalists to escalate 
commitment as well.
A social network is a set of actors, known as nodes, which can be individuals, 
groups, organizations or societies, and the relationships between these actors, known as 
ties (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Burt, 1992). Social network theory posits that actors are 
embedded in networks and these relationships, or ties, best predict actor behavior. In 
addition, people behave similarly because they are in structurally equivalent positions, 
meaning located in similar locations in their respective networks. Structurally equivalent 
actors are subjected to similar pressures and constraints and have similar opportunities. 
Understanding the social system in which actors are embedded depends not only on 
direct ties between the individual actors but also on everyone else’s ties, or lack of ties, 
with every other actor. Together, the structure of nodes and ties defines the characteristics 
of the network. As a result, there is interdependence among the units of the network, and 
the flow of information between two actors depends not only on their own relationship
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but also on how they are embedded in a cluster of relationships (Katz et ah, 2004; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Burt, 1992). In this research, the ties of interest are those 
between the focal VC firm, the VC firms in the syndicates in which the VC firm invests 
and the additional direct ties of the syndicate members.
There are two perspectives when modeling network ties. The first is to create an 
egocentric network, which is a collection of ties from the point of view of the focal actor. 
When modeling this kind of network, the ties and actors of interest are the ones 
cormecting directly to the focal actor. The second perspective is to model the entire 
network and then look at network variables in the context of the outcomes of interest 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994).
This research examines three levels of networks. The first level is the ties and 
actors directly connected to a focal VC firm. The second level examines the ties and 
actors directly cormected to a focal VC syndicate. The last is the focal firm’s position in 
the overall VC network and is modeled by all the actors and their ties, or lack of ties, in a 
defined environmental space (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). In the context of this research, 
the defined environmental space is all private equity VC firms, whether included in the 
syndicates or investing alone without a syndicate, that invest in early-stage start-up 
entrepreneurial companies in the high technology industry sector during the defined time 
period. The characteristics of the environmental space network, the focal VC firm ego 
network, and the collective VC firms within a syndicate’s ego network will be used to 
predict escalation of commitment.
A broad range of ties exists between actors, including communication, formal, 
affective, work flow, proximity, and cognitive ties. Generally, actors are linked by more
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than one kind of tie and so networks are considered to be multiplex (Katz, Lazer, Arrow 
& Contractor, 2004). Ties can be strong, such as family and friends, or weak, such as 
acquaintances (Granovetter, 1973, 1982). Weak ties are especially important when the 
actor needs unique or diverse information. Strong ties often involve a high level of trust 
between the actors. Ties can be one-way connections, known as directional ties, or non- 
directional ties. The interactions between actors can vary in frequency, medium of 
cormection, and may be positive or negative (Katz et ak, 2004).
The relationships within a network have been quantified and include a number of 
measures. Actor degree centrality indicates the extent to which actors directly send or 
receive ties to each other. Closeness centrality is the extent to which actors are connected 
directly or indirectly— for example a friend of a friend—with other actors. Betweenness 
centrality measures the extent to which actors are connected to others who are not 
connected with each other. Information flow centrality measures not only how central an 
actor is but also how easily information can flow between two nodes in the network. All 
of these centrality measures will he used because it is this advice flow that is being used 
to predict escalation of commitment.
A clique is defined as a group of actors who are connected exclusively or almost 
exclusively with each other and not with others in the network. A structural hole is 
formed when one group is isolated from another group except for one node that has ties 
to both groups. The actor occupying the node which is the structural hole controls the 
flow of information between the two groups and gains power and information (Katz et 
ak, 2004; Burt, 2001, 1997, 1992). The unit of analysis is not the individual actor, but
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rather the ties between the actors (Katz et ah, 2004; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). As a 
result, the “n” of a network study is the number o f ties rather than the number of nodes.
Social Networks, Venture Capitalists, and Escalation of Commitment
Several relevant theoretical approaches may he used to explain network 
influences on outcomes of interest. One approach presumes that people come together for 
self-interested reasons and form ties with those who may he able to help them. The 
tendency for actors to he constrained hy the relationships in which they are embedded 
both limits self-interested activity and increases the actors’ access to additional resources 
they could not access on their own (Katz et ak, 2004; Monge & Contractor, 2003; 
Coleman, 1988). The investment that actors make in social ties creates social resources 
known as social capital. Actors use social capital to gain access to opportunities or other 
resources from which they can profit (Tin, 2001; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Coleman, 
1988). For example, social capital has been documented as a factor affecting strategic 
alliance success (Gulati, 1998; Gulati & Singh, 1998). In this study, the resource that 
venture capitalists gain access to is advice, which varies in quality depending on a 
number of network and venture capitalist characteristics.
The social network approach to social capital also looks at the optimal 
communication network configuration for the task at hand. Early research on 
communication networks within groups consisted of laboratory experiments where 
patterns of communication between group members were manipulated to see the effects 
on group performance and functioning. One major early finding was that a person serving 
as a communication huh center, meaning a centralized network, was an important 
moderating variable. Centralization was best for simple tasks. On the other hand, a
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decentralized structure was best when a task was complex, information was ambiguous, 
or there was uneven distribution of information among group members; the decentralized 
structure made it more likely that needed information was available to the actor needing it 
(Leavit, 1951; Shaw, 1954, 1964, 1971). If the network of a focal VC firm is 
decentralized and not dense with ties, the firm would suffer from lack of information. If, 
on the other hand, the network is too cliquish, the firm would suffer a lack of information 
variety. In both cases, escalation would be more likely than with VC firms embedded in 
network relationships between these two extremes.
Outside the laboratory in real life work group settings, researchers replicated 
earlier findings and also found that decentralized groups outperformed centralized ones 
(Cummings & Cross, 2003; Sparrowe, Linden, Wayne & Kraimer, 2001). Groups with 
more ties outperform those with fewer ties (Baldwin, Bedell, & Johnson, 1997; Reagans 
& Zuckerman, 2001). Groups which have ties to other actors external to the group gain 
access to useful information (Mizurchi, 1996; Anacona & Caldwell, 1992). For example, 
board of director interlocks demonstrate that information from other boards on which an 
actor serves can be, and often is, brought to the focal board (Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 
1993).
Hansen (1999) documented that the tie, or relationship, strength and information 
complexity interact and affect group performance. When complex information is needed, 
a number of redundant strong ties transmitting that information are necessary in order for 
a group to actually use that information. Lazer and Katz (2004) documented another 
benefit of many group members sharing overlapping external ties— group members were
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less likely to free ride. In addition, this structural embeddedness influenced group 
members’ actions and effort (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996).
On the other hand, Burt (1992) documented the benefit of having non-redundant 
external ties, which give greater access to resources and information. VC firms located in 
portions of the network that are more densely interconnected are more likely to have 
redundant strong ties. In addition, when examining the variety of ties that all the VC 
firms in the syndicate have, some ties should be unique to an individual VC firm in the 
syndicate, which would afford the focal VC firm, and therefore the syndicate, access to a 
larger variety of information and advice, thereby escalation less likely. On the other hand, 
a VC firm which only had a few contacts through less dense or clique-like networks 
would have access to less varied information. As a result, it might be more likely to miss 
finding critical information that might help it recognize a failing venture sooner and thus 
be more likely to escalate.
The cognitive approach to explaining network influences on outcomes of interest 
includes elements from both transactive memory and cognition theories. Network ties 
facilitate information and knowledge flows between actors, something measured by the 
various centrality measures. Communication between the actors helps them identify and 
use knowledge within the group. This reduces the need for any one actor to have all the 
skills or expertise needed if these attributes are available elsewhere within the network. In 
addition, two actors with a tie with each other would be more likely to consistently 
evaluate a third actor in the same way due to cognitive consistency (Hollingshead, Fulk,
& Monge, 2002; Moreland, 1999; Wegner, 1995, 1987). Venture capitalists do invite
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other VC firms to co-invest with them in order to add a needed knowledge hase or other 
resource (De Clerc, 2002).
Lockett & Wright (1999) documented that partner selection in syndication is 
influenced most hy the following, in descending order of importance: reputation of the 
VC firm, trustworthiness of individual venture capitalists and their ability to deliver, past 
positive dealings with the venture capitalists or VC firm, and investment style, or 
refinancing and exit preferences. The reputation of an individual venture capitalist or VC 
firm affects access to other venture capitalists’ investment/advice networks and their 
other networks such as IPO investment hankers and suppliers, (Ferrary, 2003). The 
connection of VC firms to these other networks can influence the outcome of a funded 
company. Venture capitalists add economic value to the companies they fund, in part due 
to resources, advantages, and reputation effects conferred on the start-up company 
because of the venture capitalists’ network contacts (D’Amico, 2002).
Reputation can also help to reduce uncertainty because it is used to decide if 
information is credible. Knowing that information is credible increases its value. 
Information from a source which is considered credible is more likely to he believed 
credible and therefore useful (Ferrary, 2003). VC firms, which often have long-standing 
relationships with, and therefore knowledge of, other VC firms, are able to make these 
kinds of judgments about their investment partners and, therefore, about the credibility of 
their information and advice (Wright & Lockett, 2002; Ferrary, 2003). In addition, VC 
firms have different reputations and expertise in different market segments. Partners may 
be chosen explicitly for their expertise and experience in a certain industry segment or 
with a particular technology (Lockett & Wright, 1999).
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The search for partners, as for example in strategic alliances, is frequently limited 
to network members as the searcher uses trusted network members as a heuristic shortcut. 
Generally, information about more distant network potential alliance partners is obtained 
through closer network partner connections (Reagans & McEvily, 2003; Duysters & 
Lemmens, 2003; Yli-Renko& Alito, 1998; Gulati & Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1999). This is 
consistent with how venture capitalists find promising new ventures to fund. Those 
business plans forwarded to them by friends are much more likely to be funded than 
those received over the transom (Bygrave, 1987; Bygrave & Timmons, 1992; Gompers & 
Terner, 1992). Also, venture capitalists do invite other VC firms to co-invest with them in 
order to add a needed knowledge base or other resource (De Clerc, 2002). Venture 
capitalists who have high information flow centrality, that is, those who are well 
connected and can easily reach other venture capitalists through fewer layers of “friends 
of friends”, should have more opportunities to invest and better access to trustworthy 
specialized or needed advice and information, and therefore should escalate less.
The influence of network variables on escalation of commitment, as suggested by 
the literature, will be tested with the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: VC firms with less dense networks or with clique-like networks
will be more likely to escalate.
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Hypothesis 2b: VC firms located in a more densely interconnected portion of the
network, where they themselves are more densely connected to 
other VC firms, will be less likely to escalate.
Hypothesis 2c: VC firms that are not tightly and exclusively connected with only a
small number of other VC firms (i.e., are not in a clique) will 
escalate less.
Group Processes in Venture Syndicates, Social Network Functioning, and Escalation
of Commitment
One perspective for explaining network influences on outcomes that is relevant to 
group processes is based on the similarity/attraction construct. Similarity between 
individuals reduces conflict or potential conflict between them (Byrne, 1971; Sherif, 
1958). Similarity increases the likelihood of ties, as ties between actors are more likely to 
be created when the actors perceive themselves to be similar. Similarity makes 
communication easier, makes behavior more predictable, and increases trust and 
reciprocity (Brass, 1995). How similarity is determined is an area that has generated 
considerable research. Self-categorization theory argues that individuals self categorize 
themselves and in the process define their social identity. They then associate with those 
whom they perceive as similar to themselves (Turner & Oaks, 1986, 1989; Brass, 1995). 
If the close ties between venture capitalists are based on similarity, then venture 
capitalists might experience a decrease in the kinds of information and divergent 
viewpoints to which they have access. As a result, they might have more trouble 
acquiring divergent opinions as the investment progresses, increasing the possibility of 
escalation.
One problem when VC firms syndicate is the need for joint decision-making 
concerning the funded start-up company (Wright & Lockett, 2002). While many of the
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venture capital players may have worked with each other in the past, generally not all 
have. The VC firms that come together to fund a particular venture function as a group 
providing oversight when making decisions ahout continuing funding. Syndicated funds 
generally have a life of ahout ten years, with the option to extend the fund one to three 
additional years (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992; Gompers & Terner, 1999). This means that 
the life of a VC syndicate group is also ahout ten to thirteen years.
During the funding of a start-up company, individual VC firms enter or leave the 
syndicate after funding one or more rounds. Generally VC firms which make the initial 
decision to fund a venture stay involved in funding the start-up until the hoped-for final 
successful conclusion, such as an IPO or merger. This is because the VC firms which are 
in the syndicate for the entire time, not late syndicate entrants, usually make the most 
money from a successful offering. However, some VC firms specialize in a certain stage 
of funding, such as early-stage, later- stage, or just prior to the IPO. Just as VC firms can 
leave the syndicate group, they also can enter it at later stages (Bygrave & Timmons, 
1992; Guler, 2003). When a new group member enters an existing group, other group 
members have been documented to suppress conflict, something that can he detrimental 
to decision-making (Gruenfeld & Hollingshead, 1993; Gruenfeld et.ak, 1993). Group 
pressures and other group factors also can affect decision-making. Gular (2003) 
documented how VC syndicates are subjected to pressures from each other and how their 
functioning is affected by interpersonal relationships.
Wright & Lockett (2002) documented that VC syndicates make decisions using 
consensus and collective discussion. The lead member may or may not be the most 
influential member in the decision-making process. Threats to withdraw, reciprocal
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actions, and threats of non-investment in future rounds were as or more important than 
legal sanctions in making sure syndicate members complied with the syndication 
agreements. When an investment is performing badly and there are differences of opinion 
about what to do, contractual rights become most important. As a result, some of these 
actions may impede good decision-making, increasing the importance of a syndicate 
having good conflict resolution skills.
The literature on groups and teams addresses these issues. It takes time for groups 
to learn to work together productively and to effectively resolve conflict (Jehn & Mannix, 
2001). The ideal group size for complex tasks—which certainly describes the task of 
funding and guiding a new venture to success— involves tradeoffs between the greater 
resources available due to more members and the decreased member involvement due to 
larger group size (McGrath & Kravitz, 1982; Kowitz & Knutson, 1980; Scheidel & 
Crowell, 1979). On one hand, a larger group, which generally has more resources 
available, is better prepared to deal with more complex problems. As an example, venture 
capitalists sometimes invite a specific VC firm to participate in a syndicate because of the 
unique resources it can bring to the project (De Clerc, 2002). On the other hand, when a 
group is larger, fewer group members actively participate and members can be less 
committed (Bales, 1950). Diffusion of responsibility in larger groups occurs because 
individuals have lower levels of felt personal responsibility for the final outcome (Karau 
& Williams, 1993; Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 1979). De Clerc (2002) documented 
that when venture capitalists are less committed, the syndicate is more likely to escalate.
Larger groups have more problems with group processes as well. The literature 
suggests that for complicated tasks an ideal group size is between five to seven members
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(Birmingham & McCord, 2002; McGrath & Kravitz, 1982; Kowitz & Knutson, 1980; 
Scheidel & Crowell, 1979). This may or may not he the ideal size for the total number of 
venture capitalists involved in funding a new venture or for the size of the group of VC 
firms funding any one round. VC syndicate member size generally does not remain 
constant over the life of the company being funded, which complicates group process- 
related issues. Although VC firms may partner with a relatively small set of other VC 
firms, some do syndicate with a wide variety of partners (Chiplin, Robbie & Wright,
1997). As a result, some VC syndicates have more experience working together than 
others. Although larger VC syndicate groups have been documented to escalate 
(Birmingham, et al., 2003), based on the groups literature, it could he expected that VC 
firms which syndicate with other VC firms they have worked with before will he less 
likely to escalate, largely because they will he able to sidestep the problems that are 
typical to new groups and move quickly have productive, rather than unproductive, 
conflict. As a result the following is expected:
Hypothesis 3a: When VC firms work with other VC firms they have worked with
in the past they will, up to a point, escalate less than if they have 
never worked together. When they exclusively work only with 
each other, they will escalate more.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that the larger the size of a syndicate, the larger the 
number of inexperienced venture capitalists, and less committed investors all contribute 
to increased difficulty with syndicate decision-making and problem-solving coordination 
in new venture companies (D’Amico, 2002). There is also direct and indirect research 
evidence of this. Chiplin, Robbie & Wright (1997) document that syndication slows 
down and complicates decision-making, especially when the syndicate group is large and 
the investment underperfomis. Wright & Lockett (2002) document that when VC
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syndicates are large, not only are there more coordination problems but that there are 
decision-making problems as well. Birmingham, et ah, (2003) have documented that 
larger syndicates tend to escalate more frequently than smaller syndicates.
These findings suggest that larger VC syndicates have increased group process 
and decision-making problems and therefore a higher likelihood of escalation when a 
company is in trouble. On the other hand, the longitudinal group decision-making/ group 
process literature points out that experience working together as a group, use of 
consensus, and open discussion can actually improve decision-making and allow groups 
to take better advantage of the skills and knowledge of their members, resulting in 
improved performance (Arrow & McGrath, 1993; Birmingham & Michaelsen, 1999; 
Watson, Kumar & Michaelsen, 1993; Watson, Michaelsen & Sharp, 1991).
Group process is affected by a number of factors, the first of which is group 
diversity. Although group diversity may be needed to provide the range of resources 
necessary for project success, initial diversity has a potential negative impact on group 
processes (Watson, Kumar & Michaelsen, 1993; Chatman, 2001; Williams & O’Reilly,
1998) because diverse groups are less likely to be cohesive than more homogenous ones 
(Shaw, 1981). There are several reasons for this. More diverse groups typically have 
more initial difficulties, and it takes time for diverse groups to leam how to work 
together, trust each other, manage conflict, and utilize member resources effectively 
(Watson et ah, 1993; Jehn, 1995, 1997; Jehn & Mannix, 2001). In addition, as trust in 
group members increases, the willingness of members to deal with conflict, rather than 
leave it unresolved or suppress it, increases. Increasing trust also leads to increasing 
group cohesion which improves group performance, in part because unproductive
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conflict is reduced (Jarvenpaa, Knoll & Leidner, 1998; Johnson, Johnson & Scott, 1978; 
Jehn & Mannix, 2001).
Although diverse groups have more initial difficulties, if  they can resolve them 
they generally are more effective than more homogeneous groups in the long run 
(Watson et ah, 1993; Jehn, 1995, 1997; Jehn & Mannix, 2001). The group think literature 
points out the danger of too much group cohesion (Janis, 1982; Janis & Mann, 1977). In 
highly homogenous groups, especially where conflict is suppressed due to conformity 
pressures, group think could he a danger and further decrease the group’s ahility to 
recognize or consider conflicting information. On the other hand, the literature 
documents many benefits of group cohesion on decision-making. As diverse groups 
resolve and process conflict their group cohesiveness tends to increase (Evans & Dion, 
1991; Gruenfeld & Hollingshead, 1993; McGrath, 1984; Watson et al., 1993; Shaw 
1981.). Watson et al. (1993) documented that a certain level of group cohesion is 
necessary in order for a group to be able to constructively use conflict and diversity to 
find better solutions to problems. The result is enhanced group effectiveness and 
performance (Evans & Dion, 1991; Gruenfeld & Hollingshead, 1993; McGrath, 1984; 
Watson et ah, 1993; Shaw 1981.)
Experience working together as a group affects decision quality (Arrow & 
McGrath, 1993). One skill that is honed over time is constructive conflict resolution, a 
key skill for groups to master in order to utilize the resources available to them from both 
outside and inside the group. A productive group has little relationship conflict which is 
interpersonal conflict between group members. After group members have worked 
together for a while, they have little process conflict, or conflict over how to make
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decisions. Productive groups do, on the other hand, have moderate amounts of cognitive 
conflict, or conflict in the form of in depth discussions over ideas, decision options, and 
solutions. Under these conditions group performance is the highest, because when groups 
disagree over content and at the same time have little conflict in other areas, a hroader 
range of ideas and information is more freely offered, discussions are not prematurely cut 
off, information is examined more carefully, better decisions processes are used, and 
ultimately better decisions are made resulting in higher group performance (Jehn, 1995, 
1997; Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Birmingham & Michaelsen, 1999; Gruenfeld et al., 1993).
Jehn (1995, 1997) found that new groups and teams often perceived all conflict as 
interpersonal conflict which negatively impacts group performance and group cohesion. 
As time went on, successful groups and teams reduced interpersonal and process conflict 
and increased cognitive conflict which increased their problem-solving and group 
performance (Jehn, 1995, 1997; Jehn & Mannix, 2001). When groups learn to 
constructively manage cognitive conflict, their performance is increased because ideas 
are more thoroughly examined and new information is more likely to he brought to the 
table, both of which increase task performance (Jehn, 1995, 1997; Jehn & Mannix, 2001; 
Watson et ah, 1993). When groups gain new members, however, other group members 
tend to suppress any kind of conflict, and this suppression can lead to poorer decisions 
(Gruenfeld & Hollingshead, 1993; Gruenfeld et.ak, 1993). This is notable because VC 
syndicates generally have member change over time.
Self-selected groups tend to be more homogenous (Bies & Shapiro, 1988), which 
reduces their problem-solving potential. Venture capitalists generally invite other venture 
capitalists who are network members to syndicate with them. There is a tendency of close
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network members to be more homogenous than more distant or unconnected network 
members (D’Amico, 2002). This could decrease the syndicate’s potential to have the 
diverse opinions and access to unique information that helps groups de-escalate 
(Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1997). In addition, when venture capitalists are deciding about 
additional funding rounds for the start-up company, they commonly do not have all the 
information they need, which makes them prone to conduct a biased information search. 
They are then more likely to pay more attention to information that supports their pre­
decision preferences or chosen alternative, which is generally to fund in hopes of getting 
their investment back. In this situation, they are less likely to look for, pay attention to, 
bring to the table, or even consider conflicting or negative information (Galinsky & 
Moskowitz, 2000; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2000). In addition, groups tend to pay more 
attention to information they hold in common rather than to unique information known 
only to a few members (Stasser, 1992).
Groups tend not to seek disconfimiing information when making decisions, a 
tendency which leads to poorer decisions (Kray & Galinsky, 2003). Groups need to 
actively seek, find and use disconfimiing information to improve decision-making and to 
prevent escalation (Brittain, Sitkin, & Neale, 1986; Staw, 1997). De Clerc (2002) 
documented that venture capitalists do not complete a full due diligence when deciding 
on additional rounds of funding. Instead, they seek out and consider a more limited set of 
new information. In addition, many did not seek out disconfimiing information when 
they did review the prospects of the investment. If  a VC syndicate group is too 
homogenous, it may not have access to disconfimiing or diverse information without a 
deliberate search. As a result, poorer decisions may be made when a company is in
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trouble, resulting in escalation. When this is combined with a situation where the VC 
syndicate has membership that is too fluid or members who are not well known to the rest 
of the group—for example, members who are more distantly linked in the network or 
physically not co-Iocated so that there is less causal interaction—the group dynamics may 
not be conducive to allowing disconfirming information to be heard or considered, even 
if the venture capitalists actively searched out disconfirming or conflicting information.
Venture capitalists who have not worked together before may need to spend time 
building trust before they are effective in making joint decisions. This may be especially 
true if  experienced venture capitalists invite less experienced ones to join a syndicate. In 
addition, disconfirming information that a less experienced VC firm brings to the 
attention of more experienced ones may be discounted if the firms have never worked 
together, due to less trust in the judgment of the less experienced venture capitalists. As a 
result, one might expect that when a less experienced VC firm joins a syndicate later in 
the financing rounds, the syndicate receives less new information from the new member 
than it would if the VC firm was more experienced. It may be, however, that experienced 
venture capitalists put too much trust in each other and do not question each others’ 
judgments as much. The interaction of group size and previous experience working 
together suggest the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3b: Larger groups, when made up of more venture capitalists who have
worked together in the past, will escalate less than larger groups 
made up of fewer venture capitalists who have worked together in 
the past.
Summary o f hypotheses
Hypothesis la: VC firms connected to primarily inexperienced or very
experienced VC firms will escalate more than those with a higher
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Hypothesis lb: 
Hypothesis Ic: 
2a.
Hypothesis 2b:
percentage of connections to VC firms with 12-15 years of 
experience.
Syndicates with more VC firms with more industry relevant 
experience will escalate less than those with less past experience in 
that industry.
Syndicates with at least one VC firm with 12-15 years experience 
with fewer escalation outcomes and more experience in the 
industry of investment will escalate less.
VC firms with less dense networks or with clique-like networks 
will be more likely to escalate.
VC firms locafed in a more densely inferconnecfed porfion of the 
network, where they themselves are more densely connected to 
other VC firms, will be less likely to escalate.
Hypothesis 2c: 
Hypothesis 3a:
VC firms that are not tightly and exclusively connected with only a 
small number of other VC firms (i.e., are not in a clique) will 
escalate less.
When VC firms work with other VC firms they have worked with 
in the past they will, up to a point, escalate less than if they have 
never worked together. When they exclusively work only with 
each other, they will escalate more.
Hypothesis 3b: Larger groups, when made up of more venture capitalists who have
worked together in the past, will escalate less than larger groups made up of fewer 
venture capitalists who have worked together in the past.
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Methods
Previous research has documented that venture capital firms can escalate their 
commitment to failing new start-ups. This study examines the venture capital advice 
network’s influence on escalation of commitment. Network analysis and regression are 
used to analyze the data.
Network Analysis
Basic network analysis is done using the network analysis program UCINET. The 
data collected is about the ties, or relationships, between nodes or actors. This program 
models networks graphically by showing actor ties between VC firms who have funded 
new start-ups together, tie strength, and information about both the individual VC firm 
actor and the network as a whole. For each node, UCINET computes network variables 
and can attach attribute information as well. UCINET’s output can he exported to other 
statistical programs, with statistical network variable data and attribute data attached to 
each actor in the exported data. Pajek was used for drawing the graphic visualization of 
the network. It is better than UCINET in terms of graphics.
This study looks at the entire network rather than using samples. Although a given 
network may he chosen by a random sample of all networks in a larger population, when 
doing network analysis it is important to have information about every node in the chosen 
network sampled rather than having a random sample of network members. It is the 
nature of the entire network and each actor’s position within it that is of interest. As a 
result, randomly sampling actors in the network would mean modeling an incomplete 
network, which could easily destroy the network’s fundamental characteristics. As a
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result, having relatively little missing data is important. It is also important to be clear 
about the boundaries of the network under study (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
Once ail the connections between actors are entered into UCINET, a model of the 
entire network is obtained and it is possible to examine parts of the networks. UCINET 
statistically divides networks into components based on tie connections and density. In 
this study, the entire network is used. UCINET also makes it possible to look at “local 
neighborhoods” by considering only the ties between focal actor A and A ’s “neighbors”, 
which are other actors, Bi, directly connected to focal actor A. The “friends of friends” 
level can be considered by observing actors Ci connected to Bi connected to A 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Some hypotheses contrast network components. When 
considering advice networks, sometimes only the “neighbors” Bi are considered; 
sometimes the “friends of friends” Ci are used. It is the network actor tie variable values 
and sometimes the demographic values of the actor that are used as the independent 
variables.
Since the relationship between the actors, rather than the actors themselves, is the 
focus of study, n is generally the number of ties between actors. As a result, data 
collection consists of obtaining a list of all the ties that exist between all actors in the 
network. Data collection also includes demographic or other attribute variables for a 
given actor. For any given network, there are a maximum number of ties possible where 
every actor is connected to every other actor. There is also a minimum number of ties 
where no actor is connected to any other actor. In the latter case all actors would be 
isolates. All network variables are computed within the context of the number of actors in 
the specific network under study. As a result, it is not possible to directly compare the
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network variable values for one actor in one network to that o f an actor in a different 
network. The values are specific and relative to the network under examination 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
In this study, the focal VC firms consist of the entire population of VC firms who 
funded high technology companies between 1990 and 1995. In addition, information 
about the VC firms each focal VC firm partnered with in the past are of interest. The time 
period chosen provides enough time to learn the outcome of the companies funded and 
reflects the general ten-year lifespan of VC syndicates from first funding to final 
disposition. The industries chosen—computers, semi-conductors, and communications— 
are all in high-velocity environments where rapid change, along with rapid speed to 
market of new products, is the norm. This increases the likelihood that all companies in 
the study will have reached their final disposition by December 2005.
The study is a bi-modal network because it includes information about both the 
VC firms and the companies they funded, although the ties of interest are only those 
between the VC firms. As such, the network model represents only VC firm-to-VC firm 
ties. The companies funded are of interest because they determine the existence of those 
ties. A tie between two actors is coded as either present or absent based on whether or not 
they have funded a specific company together. Company-funded information is attached 
to each VC firm so that Bi and Ci ties can be determined. The final disposition of the 
companies first funded in the 1990-1995 time period is used as the dependent variable. 
Network analysis is used only to graphically model the network and to obtain values for 
network variables. The network variables attached to the relationships between VC firms, 
obtained by network analysis, are used to predict, using regression, target company
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outcomes. UCINET's other analytic possibilities and capabilities are not of interest for 
this study.
Data
Data for this study came from VentureXpert from Thompson Financial/Venture 
Economics. VentureXpert, a web-based commercial database, is one of the few 
comprehensive databases of new venture and venture capital information. It lists the 
following information about venture capital firms:
1) VC firm’s name and primary address (secondary office addresses are not
included),
2) A proprietary geographic location code of the primary address,
3) Date of founding,
4) Names and dates of funds raised,
5) Entrepreneurial companies invested in, including in which round, and
6) Any name changes for the VC firms.
This database lists the following information for entrepreneurial companies:
1) The date the company was first incorporated,
2) The company’s industry
3) The company’s name and address,
4) Any name changes for the company,
5) A proprietary geographic location code, and
6) The ultimate disposition of the company—IPO date, merger date and merger 
partner, bankruptcy date, etc.
2 This a proprietary system that is more fine grained than SIC code, although the industry could be tracked 
back to SIC code if necessary.
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Information about rounds of funding for each company includes the following:
1) The company’s stage at each round of funding— early stage, late stage, 
expansion, etc.,
2) Date and total amount of funding received in each round, and
3) Names of the VC firms that contributed to each round.
Although VentureXpert is the best available source of date, it has weaknesses 
which affect its usefulness for this study. These weaknesses include the following:
1) There is some underreporting of unsuccessful companies relative to IPOs 
and mergers. About half the companies in this database went public or were 
acquired, even though the VC industry average is about one third 
(Birmingham, et al., 2003; Gompers & Terner, 1999).
2) Private equity VC firms, the ones of interest in this study, are not required to 
report some of the information that would contribute to a less biased 
database.
3) Some information in reporting rounds of funding is missing for a few 
companies.
4) VentureXpert frequently reports a company’s outcome as “active 
investment” when, in fact, the company is defunct. Fortunately, by using 
LexisNexis it is possible to find IPO, merger, and bankruptcy information 
for some of the companies with missing information, as well as “active 
investment” disposition information. In addition, the use of online business 
phone directories can help confirm the disposition of missing companies. 
Consistent with Birmingham, et al. (2003), a company is classified as out of
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business if there is no trace of it for two years beyond the last round of 
funding from any of these sources.
Escalation of commitment is analyzed only with reference to private equity VC 
firms funding early stage new start-ups. The research is limited to start-up companies in 
the computer, communications, and superconductor industries because they are high- 
velocity, high-technology industries. Information is collected concerning all deals the 
focal VC firms made for the fifteen years prior to 1990 because this is needed to establish 
the advice network. Documenting prior embeddedness of the VC firms before examining 
the years o f interest allows greater accuracy in demonstrating network influence on 
escalation. It also makes it possible to determine if a VC firm specializes in only certain 
industries, funds only new start-ups, or acts as a generalist.
The companies of interest are all high technology companies that were classified 
as early stage (new start-up) companies between 1990 and 1995, along with the VC firms 
that funded them. The funding and status of these companies is tracked through 
December 2005. The VC firm’s fund that is used to fund a start-up company usually has 
a ten-year life with up to three years extension possible. Typically, the first four to seven 
years is spent developing the company with the intent of taking it public; most, if  not all, 
of the money is spent during that time. The final years of the fund’s life are spent 
recouping the investment and distributing the proceeds. Venture capitalists often retain a 
stake in the company for two years beyond an IPO due to legal restrictions, the issues 
involved in unloading large blocks of stock at once, and the sometimes dramatic growth 
of the stock’s value (Gompers & Lerner, 1999). It is assumed that all funds used to fund 
any new company during this time period would be spent by December 2005.
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Dependent and Independent Variables
Dependent variables
Company outcome: Consistent with entrepreneur and venture capital research, 
outcomes are classified as IPO, acquired/merger, still private, and out of business 
(Ruhnka, Feldman & Dean, 1992). While some companies that are still private may be 
profitable, the majority are not. In determining the status of a still-private company, if 
evidence shows that the company is still in business with corporate offices, employees, 
and a product generating income, then the company is coded as private and successful 
even though it has not yet had an IPO/merger. Where no evidence indicates that a 
company still exists and the company has gone at least two years without a round of 
funding, it is coded as out of business. Where no evidence can be found concerning a 
company’s disposition, if  it has been less than two years since the last round of funding, 
the company is coded as unknown. A company is categorized as private and unsuccessful 
if  a record shows it exists and is not profitable; otherwise, it is categorized as out of 
business.
Timeliness o f exit: Because it is impossible to determine in advance when 
escalation will occur, a judgment needs to be made after the fact. Consistent with 
Birmingham et al. (2003), there are fundamentally two types of good decisions 
concerning the funding of new ventures. The first is the decision to keep funding a 
company that results in an IPO, is acquired, merges, or is otherwise profitable. The 
second is recognizing, early in the funding process, that one is backing a failing company 
and deciding to cut off funding after one or two rounds of funding to minimize losses. In 
both cases, the venture capitalist’s decision is coded as good decision-making. Poor
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decision-making is coded for companies that had more than two rounds of funding and 
are either out of business or are “living dead”—meaning companies still private in 
December 2005 but not profitable.
Independent variables
There are two different kinds of independent variables. The first are demographic 
variables such as date of founding for the VC firms, VC syndicates, and entrepreneurial 
companies. The second are network variables. The former, listed in the database 
referenced earlier, required additional research to fill in missing information. The latter 
required examining each new start-up of interest, as well as historical information going 
back 15 years prior to 1990, in order to list which VC firms funded which companies, and 
then entering each tie and tie type. Using UCINET, this matrix of ties was then used to 
create advice networks for the VC firms.
Demosraphic variables:
1) Date the VC firm was founded,
2) The number of companies the VC firm funded prior to 1990 (a measure of 
experience),
3) Industries in which the VC firm has funded - by number and by percent of 
total number of companies funded,
4) Percentages and absolute numbers of successes, good timing early failures, 
and escalations of past ventures the VC firm funded as a measure of venture 
capitalist skill.
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Network independent variables
The variables for each network require first coding the ties between the VC 
firms in a matrix. UCINET is then used to create the network and network variable values 
for each VC firm. These network variables and their values are then exported and are 
used with regression analyses.
The netw’ork ties:
Network ties, those funding ties between VC firms that have funded in 
syndicates together, are entered in a matrix as non-directional ties. It is not possible to 
determine with the available data which is the lead VC firm. Using the resultant matrix, 
UCINET creates a picture of the network and calculates the network variables of interest 
for each node. The n for subsequent analysis then becomes the number of ties between 
VC firms rather than the number of VC firms.
The nePA’ork variables created from the resulting network, using UCINET, are as 
follows;
1. Density is the number of connections in the entire graph over the number of 
possible connections. It is a property of the network (Wasserman and Faust,
1994).
2. K-plex measures the “local” density around each node. Because of the focus on 
the ties around the node, k-plex is used to measure cliques which do not have 
mutually exclusive memberships. It looks at the density of ties between the clique 
members compared to outside the clique ties (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). In 
this case the VC firms are ranked by k-plex score. This is abbreviated as 
VCkplexRankl in the analyses.
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3. Information flow centrality is the best measure of centrality in a network with 
regards to how easily information can get to a specific node. This measure takes 
into account all paths, both direct and indirect, between the nodes. Paths are also 
weighted inversely with respect to their length. A short connection between two 
actors counts more than a long one, because information is more likely to he 
received by the node of interest if  the path is short (Jaaskelainen, 2001; 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
4. Actor degree centrality is the extent to which actors directly send or receive ties to 
each other. An actor with a high degree of actor centrality would he able to easily 
send or receive advice directly from someone.
5. Closeness centrality, an inverse measure, is the extent to which actors are 
connected directly or indirectly (for example a friend of a friend) with other 
actors. Actors with a low degree of closeness centrality can get advice both from 
others they are directly connected to and indirectly from “friends of a friend”. 
Networks themselves can he made up of few ties between actors or many ties 
between actors. To the extent that an actor has few ties in a dense network that 
actor would he “out of the loop”.
6. Betweenness centrality is the extent to which actors are connected to others that 
are not connected with each other. This increases the amount of unique 
information to which the actor has access. High Betweenness centrality gives an 
actor power because the actor can control the flow o f information.
7. Several variables measure the experience of the VC firms funding a particular 
company as well as the experience of the VC firms directly connected to these
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focal actors. VCAgel is the collective age of the VC firms directly connected to 
the focal start-up company. VCAge2 is the collective age of the VC firms which 
are not in VCAgel hut which are directly connected to the VC firms in VCAgel
8. The ‘worked together in the past’ variable includes those VC firms that have 
worked together in the past, prior to the current investment. It is ahhreviated as
Analysis o f Hypotheses
First, general descriptive statistics are obtained about the network using UCINET. 
This includes how many components, how many VC firms in each component, and the 
network mean, median, and mode of the network variables listed above. The network is 
graphically modeled using Pajek.
UCINET is then used to determine each individual VC firm’s network values for 
the variables listed above. This output is exported to SAS for further analysis using 
regression. For each hypothesis that has a curvilinear prediction, the data is checked for 
curviiinearity using the routine in SAS.
The demographic variable information remains attached to each VC firm and is 
included. Instead of a familiar regression data spreadsheet where n would be the number 
of VC firms or companies funded, n is the number of ties. This number of ties varies with 
the regression equation as some VC firms may be left out of some regressions due to 
missing demographic or other VC-specific information The ties are anchored to the 
individual VC firms and company outcomes so that it is possible to analyze them asking 
questions concerning VC tie influence on company outcome.
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The hypotheses are analyzed using regression, specifically, SAS, PROC GLM. 
This was an exploratory analysis and it is recognized that with a categorical (3 levels) 
dependent variable logistical regression (specifically SAS PROC CATMOD) would have 
been a better choice. Problems were encountered when using PROC CATMOD which is 
discussed in Chapter Four.
The first set of hypotheses concern the experience of the VC firm and that of their 
advice network.
Hypothesis la: VC firms connected to primarily inexperienced or very
experienced VC firms will escalate more than those with a higher 
percentage of connections to VC firms with 12-15 years of 
experience.
The demographic variables age of VC firm (VCAgel and VCAge2) and number of 
companies each VC firm funded in the past (VCNumCompaniesHistl) are used. Because 
this is a network question, the numbers “ 1” and “2” are attached to VC Age variables. The 
number 1 designates that syndicate members are funding the company. The number 2 
designates that the VC firms have ties to the syndicate VC firms. Both are different 
measures of experience. All three are entered into the regression equation separately. The 
interactions of VCAgel and VCAge2 with the number of companies funded in the past are 
also included because a young VC firm that has funded a large number of companies may 
have a different experience level than an older VC firm that has funded fewer companies. 
The interaction of VCAgel with VCAge2 also is included because, for example, a less 
experienced focal VC firm’s ties to more experienced VC firms may matter more than a 
more experienced focal VC firm’s ties to less experienced VC firms. Again, n is ties. 
There is some missing age information for VC firms.
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Hypothesis lb: Syndicates with more VC firms with more industry relevant
experience will escalate less than those with less past experience in 
that industry.
Looking at only syndicate members, experience has heen coded as the number 
{VCSameHisl) and percent of the total number {VCScimeHisPct 1) of firms funded in the 
past in the same industry; the number {VCRelatedHisT) and percent {VCRelatedHisPctl) 
of firms funded in a related industry; and the number (VCUnrelatedHisl) and percent 
(VCUnrelatedHisPctl) of firms funded in an umelated industry. Each variable is entered 
separately in the regression equation.
Hypothesis Ic: Syndicates with at least one VC firm with 12-15 years experience
with fewer escalation outcomes and more experience in the 
industry of investment will escalate less.
This is a three-way interaction regression hypothesis at the syndicate level. 
Included in the regression are VCNumComapniesHisl, VCAgel, and VCSameHisl, all 
variables from hypothesis la  and Ih. A count of the number of times the venture 
capitalist has escalated in the past (VCEscalateHisl) is also included. All two-way and 
three-way interactions are included.
The second set of hypotheses use the network variables. Due to potential 
colinearity problems with the measures of centrality, only those with correlations less 
than p<0.8 will he used in the same regression equation.
Hypothesis 2a: VC firms with less dense networks or with clique-like networks
will he more likely to escalate.
The density network variable k-plex {VCKplexRankl) measures how easily 
information can flow to a particular node and is used to predict company outcome with 
regression. N  in this regression is related to number of ties. It is a relaxed measure of a 
clique.
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Hypothesis 2b: VC firms located in a more densely interconnected portion of the
network, where they themselves are more densely connected to 
other VC firms, will be less likely to escalate.
This hypothesis looks at network density and centrality interactions. Because each 
centrality network variable measures a slightly different aspect of centrality, ail the 
measures are included. Variables include the number 1 or 2, consistent with usage in the 
other hypotheses. Actor degree centrality, Betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, 
and information flow centrality are included. The density measure that also includes 
connections is k-plex (VCKplexRankl). All variables are entered individually. All two- 
way interactions are entered into the regression equation. As these variables measure 
different aspects of the same thing they tend to be highly correlated. As a result no 
variable pair with a correlation above 0.8 will be used in the same regression equation to 
prevent colinearity problems.
Hypothesis 2c: VC firms that are not tightly and exclusively connected with only a
small number of other VC firms (i.e., are not in a clique) will 
escalate less.
This is a simple regression equation using the network k-plex variable (VCK- 
plexRankl) to predict escalation.
This last set of hypotheses concern the VC syndicate and their experience 
working together as a group in the past.
Hypothesis 3a: When VC firms work with other VC firms they have worked with
in the past they will, up to a point, escalate less than if they have 
never worked together. When they exclusively work only with 
each other, they will escalate more.
The network ties of worked together in the past (VCl VC2WorkedinPast) is used 
to predict escalation using regression. The result is expected to be curvilinear.
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Hypothesis 3b: Larger groups, when made up of more venture capitalists who have
worked together in the past, will escalate less than larger groups 
made up of fewer venture capitalists who have worked together in 
the past.
This interaction regression equation uses VClVC2WorkedlnPast, also used in 
hypothesis 3a, and the VC syndicate’s size (CoNoVC’s). Each variable is entered into the 
regression equation separately and as an interaction term.
Summary
Using data obtained from VentureXpert, a dataset has been created from VC 
funding ties. Using UCINET, this dataset is turned into a network and various network 
variables are obtained for the VC firms. The variables are then exported, along with the 
demographic venture capitalist information, to SAS. Regression is then used to test the 
influence of the advice network variables and demographics on venture capitalist 
escalation of commitment. N  is the number of ties, which may vary between different 
hypotheses if information for a particular VC firm is missing.
Chapter 4 will present the results of the analysis. Chapter 5 will include a 
summary and discussion of the results as well as suggestions for future research.
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Results
The fundamental set of questions this research is trying to answer pertains to 
whether the advice networks of venture capital (VC) firms, along with the attributes of 
the VC firms that make up their advice networks, influence VC syndicate escalation of 
commitment to failing entrepreneurial companies. Venture capitalists are most likely to 
ask for advice from other members o f their network. One major source of potential 
advice network members is another VC firm with which the focal VC firm has funded 
new start-up companies in the past. Not all advice network members, however, give 
equally good advice. It is hypothesized that the experience level, age, and past 
success/failure record of network members affects the value of their advice. A s a result, 
the configuration of the advice networks of VC firms should affect their propensity to 
escalate their commitment to failing start-up companies.
The target population studied was the population of VC firms funding new (seed 
or early stage) high-technology start-up companies which received their first round of 
funding between 1990 and 1995. The advice network was derived from VC funding 
partnerships that existed prior to 1990. Data came from the Thompson Financial 
VentureXpert database. The network variables were created from doing a network 
analysis using the network computer program UCINET. When creating the network, a tie 
was said to exist between two firms if they funded together prior to 1990. These past ties 
were then used to determine VC firm network variable values. The network variables and 
the demographic variables were then used to examine current investment outcomes.
The VC network ended up being very dense, and as a result, many of the network 
variables had little variance. As a result of this problem, the data were analyzed twice.
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The first set of analyses included the entire advice network (Netl), which included the 
entire pool of VC firms that might be utilized for advice by the focal VC firm. The 
second analyses (Net2) included only those VC firms connected to other VC firms which 
funded in the first two rounds o f funding. Net2 was defined in these terms because it is 
the venture capitalists in these first two rounds (and not other venture capitalists in further 
rounds of funding) that make the decision to fund the third round. Escalation of 
commitment was operationalized as failed start-up companies that received more than 
two rounds of funding. Therefore, it made sense to look at the advice network (Net2) of 
those making the fateful decision to fund Round 3. It was also hoped that this network 
would be less dense and thus have more variance in the network variables. Each time 
results are presented, results from the complete network (Netl) are presented first, 
followed by results from the early rounds network (Net2). Regression (PROC GLM in 
SAS) was used to analyze the data.
Although the independent variables are continuous, the dependent variable is 
categorical (3 levels). While logistical regression (PROC CATMOD in SAS) would have 
been a more appropriate analysis technique due to the categorical nature of the outcome 
variable, several technical problems were encountered using CATMOD. According to the 
SAS manual website (2006):
“Continuous Variables
Computational difficulties may occur if you have a continuous 
variable with a large number of unique values and you use this 
variable in a DIRECT statement, since an observation often represents 
a separate population of size one. At this extreme of sparseness, the 
weighted least-squares method is inappropriate since there are too 
many zero frequencies. Therefore, you should use the maximum 
likelihood method. PROC CATMOD is not designed optimally for 
continuous variables and therefore may be less efficient and may be 
unable to allocate sufficient memory to handle this problem.”
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Using the CATMOD least squared method resulted in an error statement, and as a 
result, SAS defaulted to the maximum likelihood method. In addition, out of memory 
errors occurred repeatedly which meant the analyses could not be performed. This 
chapter reports the preliminary, exploratory outcomes of these hypotheses using 
regression (SAS PROC GLM) as the analysis tool.
Descriptive statistics
There were 498 firms in high-technology, high-velocity industries (computers, 
superconductors, and communication, as coded by VentureXpert) that received their first 
round of funding from private venture capital firms between January 1, 1990 and 
December 31, 1995. In the complete network (Netl), there were 297 different VC firms 
in this population; however, 3 were excluded due to errors in the original VentureXpert 
database. As a result, 294 different VC firms were used in this study. There were 31,087 
different dyadic ties between the different VC firms from the inception of the 
VentureXpert database (data goes back to 1975) through 1989, the advice network time 
period. Table 4.1 gives the descriptive statistics for the companies.
For the time period of 1990-1995, VC firms invested in an average of 6.61 new 
start-ups with a standard deviation of 7.599. The range was 1-62 companies; the mode 
was 4 companies. There were 297 VC firms that funded start-up companies during 1990- 
1995, all of which are included in the N etl advice network. In Net2, the early rounds 
network, 191 different VC firms funded in Rounds 1 and/or 2. As a result, the Net2 
advice network includes the ties for only these 191 VC firms.
O f the 498 new start-ups funded, 62.49% were successful (IPO, merger, or 
acquisition) and 20.9% ventures, none of which were ultimately successful, were funded
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for only one or two rounds because of VC firms’ recognition that they would not result in 
a successful outcome. Escalation of commitment occurred in 16.7% of the cases where 
the VC firms funded a new start-up beyond two rounds of funding but the venture 
ultimately failed. Past research has documented that approximately 33% of VC firms’ 
investments result in an IPO, merger or acquisition (Gompers & Lerner, 2001). The 
VentureXpert database has about twice the percentage of successful outcomes as would 
be expected from previous research into VC firm success rates. As a result, it is clear that 
successful outcomes are over-represented in this database and unsuccessful outcomes 
(whether the good decision to stop funding a loser early or the escalation of commitment 
case) are under-represented. There is no public reporting requirement for VC firms, there 
is considerable secrecy surrounding investments, and to bolster their reputations some 
may not report to the media or to VentureXpert some start-up failures. Potential investors 
and fund seeking entrepreneurs use this database to research VC firms.
Network descriptive statistics include information about the advice network ties 
between nodes (VC firms), the extent to which these ties are non-random (i.e., the extent 
to which the network is scale-free), and advice network density. The number of non­
duplicate ties between VC firms in the advice network is shown in Table 4.2. There were 
31,087 unique ties between the different VC firms for Netl and 13,486 ties for Net2.
A log plot (Table 4.3) of the frequency of the degree distribution is done to see if 
the network is scale-free, meaning that the ties between nodes in the network are not 
randomly distributed. When the probability of a tie between two nodes is not random and 
uniform, the relationships between actors (VC firms) are likely to be a result of social 
processes which drive the relationship, or tie, formation (Barabasi & Albert, 1999). If  the
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network is scale-free, then the log plot is generally a straight line. In both Netl and Net2, 
the log plot results in a straight line except for the left tail which drops off. As a result, 
the advice network is likely to be a non-random set of ties driven by social forces that 
influence VC firms to create relationships with each other. A log plot of this shape (with 
the tail drop off) is common in completely connected, very dense networks, as this one is, 
and, as such, presents analytic problems due to the current limitations of network analytic 
tools (Newman, Watts and Strogatz, 2002). In table 4.3 the first two graphs for N etl and 
Net2 show the log transformation of frequency (infreq) plotted against the degree 
(indegree). The second two graphs drop the left tail outliers and put in a regression line 
through the scatter plot.
Both Netl and Net2 are very dense networks (Table 4.4), which is not common.
In fact, the creator of the UCINET network analysis program used in this research,
Steven Borgatti (2006), stated, “I have seen a number of networks of the kind you 
describe, and none that size have had such high density”. While there is not a statistical 
significance test for network density, a rough idea of density can be obtained using the 
method described below (Borgatti, 2006; Preiss & Eng, 1997). Using the Preiss & Eng 
(1997) method to determine network density, for N etl the average degree, or number of 
ties, is 11.04. The number of vertices, or number of VC firms in the main component, (v), 
is 277. Because this is an undirected graph, the maximum number of edges (ties) is 
277(276)72 = 38,226. This network, with 31,087 vertices, is nearly a completely 
connected network. The formula for figuring out density is Uv^ = density. The factor f  is
11.04/277 = 0.039856. Density then is 0.039856*(277)^ = 3058.11. Any network with a 
density of greater than 3 or 4 is considered dense. This network is very dense. For Net2,
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the maximum possible number of non-duplicate ties is 16,471 ties in the main 
component. There are 13,485 actual ties. Factor f  = 4.29/181=0.023702. Density for Net2 
= 776.49. Although less dense than N etl, Net2 is still a very dense network 
Table 4.1
Descriptive statistics for new start-up companies 
Statistics
conofvcs
N Valid 498
Missing 0
Mean 6.61
Median 4.00
Mode 1
Std. Deviation 7.599
Minimum 1
Maximum 62
Conofvcs is the number of venture capitalists investing in a company.
CoEscaiate
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid 1 311 62.4 62.4 62.4
2 104 20.9 20.9 833
3 83 16.7 16.7 100.0
Total 498 100.0 100.0
CoEscalate is the outcome of the company variable:
1= good decision, good outcome (IPO, merger, acquisition, private -  still 
successful)
2= good decision, poor outcome (no more than 1 or 2 rounds of funding) 
3= poor decision, poor outcome (escalate corrmiitment by continuing to 
fund past two rounds of funding and company ultimately failed)
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Table 4.2
Number of non-duplicate ties between VC firms in the advice network
Statistics
Nett
conofvcs
N Valid 
Missing
31087
0
Net2
conofvcs
N Valid 
Missing
13485
0
N is the number of non-duplicate ties between VC firms in the advice 
network
N eti is the entire advice network
Net2 is the advice network of Round 1 and Round 2 VC firms
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Table 4.3
Log transformation of degree network distributions, scale free character
Log plot
N e t l
Indegree
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Table 4.3, continued
Net2
Log-log plot of degree distribution, linear portion of graph
VC-VC network of 1st and 2nd-round investors 1990-1999
3.50-
3.43-
3.37-
3.18-
2.64-
C7 2.30-
0)
i : 2.20-
c
1.79-
1.61 -
1.39-
1.10-
0.69-
0.00-
I
0.00
I
1.00
I
2.00
I
3.00
Indegree
Shows "scale-free" character of VC-VC network
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Table 4.3, continued
Netl
Infreq
4.00 -
3 .0 0 -
co
2 .0 0 -
o o
1.0 0 -
00 o Œ)
0.00
1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00
O Observed 
 Linear
Indegree
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Table 4.3, continued
Table 4.4
Net2
Infreq
4.00  -
3.00  -
o o
2.00  -
oo
1.0 0  -
ooo o
0.00
1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00
O Observed 
 Linear
Indegree
infreq -  frequency 
indegree -  degree
Network density
Density 
Netl 3058.11
Net2 776.49
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The last set of descriptive statistics relates to the network indices (Tahie 4.5). In 
this case, the network variables are actor degree centrality, betweenness centrality, 
information centrality, closeness centrality, and k-piex rank.
Actor degree centrality is the extent to which actors have direct ties to each other. 
An actor with a high degree of actor centrality is directly connected to more actors and 
would be able to easily send advice to or receive advice directly from another actor. On 
average, Netl VC firms send or receive information from 11.04 other VC firms. The 
median is 6 and the standard deviation is 12.921. Net2 VC firms send or receive ties from 
4.29 other VC firms on average, with a median of 2 and a standard deviation of 6.127. 
These scores are different because the advice networks have been defined differently. Not 
all o f the VC firms to which the focal VC firm is connected in N etl are included in Net2. 
As a result it makes sense that the number of ties drops in Net2.
Betweenness centrality is the extent to which the focal VC firm has ties to two or 
more VC firms that do not have ties to each other. The focal VC firm is located 
“between” the other VC firms, meaning that the only way the other VC firms can 
communicate with each other is when the focal VC firm passes along information. This 
measure examines only the shortest path between two VC firms that passes through the 
VC firm of interest. Betweenness centrality scores range from 0 to 1. An actor with a 
high betweenness centrality score has more access to unique information. In addition, an 
actor with high betweenness centrality is powerful because the actor can control the flow 
of information through a network. In contrast, an actor with a low betweenness score is
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not occupying a structural hole in the network and does not need to rely on a high 
hetweenness score actor to receive or send information.
Since information can take many paths, in most cases one actor cannot hlock a 
low hetweemiess-score actor’s access to information hy failing to pass it on. The two 
exceptions occur when the focal actors have a hetweenness score of zero— i.e., they are 
not “between” anyone. The first is when the focal actor is an isolate or a member of an 
isolated dyad. The second is when the focal actor is a terminus, similar to being located at 
the end of a branch on a tree. The focal actor is connected to only one other actor, who 
then controls all the information flow to the focal actor.
With Netl the mean hetweenness centrality is 0.006, the median is 0.0003, and 
the standard deviation is 0.0128. These scores indicate that relatively few VC firms 
occupy structural holes or control information flow through the network. This is 
consistent with a highly interconnected network such as this one. For Net2 the mean is 
0.0098, the median is 0.0008, and the standard deviation is 0.1768. Again, no VC firms 
are controlling the flow of information through the network. The actors have many ways 
to get the same information. The results are very similar for both networks.
Information flow centrality is the best measure of centrality in a network with 
regards to how easily information can get to a specific node. Information does not always 
take the shortest route between two nodes. Information flow centrality includes not only 
the hetweenness measure of the shortest route hut also all longer routes between two VC 
firms that pass through the focal VC firm. The risk of information not making it from 
point A to point B increases as the number of nodes that need to pass the information 
along increases. As a result, these paths are also weighted inversely with respect to their
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length, meaning that a short connection between two actors counts more than a long one. 
Actors with a high information centrality score are located on many paths between other 
nodes and are also on a higher number of “shorter” paths. They have multiple 
opportunities to receive and pass on information because they are located on “busy 
highway intersections” (Bonacich, 1987; Jaaskelainen, 2001; Wasserman and Faust, 
1994). The results for both networks are similar. For Netl the mean is 0.5507, the median 
is 0.5784, and the standard deviation is 0.27649; this means that the typical path length is 
midway between the minimum and maximum lengths, making it reasonably easy for 
information to flow through the network. For Net2 the mean is 0.5434, the median is 
0.5659, and the standard deviation is 0.28052. Information flows relatively easily through 
Net2 as well.
Closeness centrality, an inverse measure of centrality, incorporates actor degree 
and the clustering of other actors around the actor’s direct ties. It also incorporates the 
notion of how far the actor is from each node. A focal actor with few ties in a dense 
network has low degree centrality. To the extent that the “friends” of this actor 
themselves have low degree centrality, the focal actor is “out of the loop”. In this 
position, the focal actor would receive less, and less varied, information, because the 
focal actor would he “further” from others and would have a longer path to reach distant 
actors. The further the focal actor is from other actors and the lower the actor degree, the 
higher the closeness centrality score. Indeed, due to the centrality score being an inverse 
measure, it is perhaps easier to think of it as a “farness” centrality score, because the 
higher the score the further the focal actor is from being central. VC firms with low 
closeness centrality are “closer” to other VC firms. Actors with a low degree of closeness
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centrality can get more advice directly from “friends” and indirectly from “friends of a 
friend” than can actors with a higher closeness centrality score. Scores range from 0 to 1. 
For Netl the mean is 0.3618, the median is 0.3614, and the standard deviation is 0.07762. 
This means that the network is more intercormected than not in terms of getting advice 
from friends of friends. Again, this is consistent with a densely intercormected network. 
For Net2 the mean is 0.2754, the median is 0.2903, and the standard deviation is 0.08783. 
The average closeness of the VC firms in Net 2 is “closer” than in N etl, although hoth 
networks have low scores.
K-plex is a measure of the “local” density of ties around the focal VC firm, 
meaning the cluster of ties in the general vicinity of each node. Instead of looking at 
friends and friends of friends as closeness centrality does, this measure focuses on the 
extent to which the actors in the local density area are interconnected with each other and 
not with others. Because of the focus on the ties around the node, this measure also is 
used to measure cliques when cliques do not have mutually exclusive memberships. It 
looks at the density of ties between the clique members as compared to those outside the 
clique (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
Due to the density of the network, the VC firm local density scores were 
normalized and then ranked hy k-plex tie values. This was done both to artificially create 
more variance when testing the hypotheses and to try to identify clusters, since no 
clusters were identified in the main component when the two networks were examined 
for cliques and subcomponents. This attempt was not particularly successful, probably 
because of the extensive interconnection between VC firms across the entire network.
The very low average hetweenness scores imply that very few venture capitalists fill
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structural hole positions between groups, and the inability to identify subcomponents 
means that few opportunities for structural holes exist to begin with. Thus, the attempt to 
find clusters based on k-piex scores was a long shot that did not pay off.
A k-piex score of 1 indicates a lower density of interconnected ciique-Iike ties, 
with i 12 being the highest density of ties. For Netl the mean is 57.63, the medium is 54, 
and the standard deviation is 31.090. This is consistent with a densely interconnected 
network where the advice network is relatively large and interconnected compared to the 
size of the network. For Net2 the mean is 32.38, the medium is 32.00, and the standard 
deviation is 17.715. These ranks are lower because there are fewer VC firms in this 
network; however, the results are structurally consistent with N e tl.
The correlation matrix documents that many of the network measures of centrality 
are correlated, to the point of creating colinearity problems when calculating regressions. 
This is not surprising since these centrality measures are measuring different aspects of 
central location in a network and some measures incorporate aspects of other centrality 
measures. For both networks, all correlations between centrality measures are statistically 
significant at the .05 level. In N etl, degree and betweenness, degree and closeness, 
information centrality and closeness, information centrality and k-plex rank, and 
closeness and k-plex rank all have correlations greater than 0.8. For Net2, the only 
centrality measures that do not have correlations greater than 0.8 are betweenness and 
information centrality, betweenness and closeness, and betweenness and k-plex rank. All 
the other combinations create colinearity problems in regressions (see Table 4.6).
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Table 4.5
Network descriptive statistics
Net1 Statistics
VCdegree
VCbetweenn
ess
VCInfocentrali
ty VCCioseness VCkplexRank
N Valid 294 277 277 277 271
Missing^ 0 17 17 17 23
Mean 11.04 .0060 .5507 .3618 57.63
Median 6.00 .0003 .5784 .3614 54.00
Mode 3 .00 .00 .01 40
Std. Deviation 12.921 .01280 .27649 .07762 31.090
Net2 Statistics
VCdegree
VCbetweenn
ess
VCInfocentralit
y VCCioseness VCkplexRank
N Valid 191 181 181 181 181
Missing^ 103 113 113 113 113
Mean 4.29 .0098 .5434 .2754 32.38
Median 2.00 .0008 .5659 .2903 32.00
Mode 0 .00 .00 .01 41
Std. Deviation 6.127 .01768 .28052 .08783 17.715
VCdegree is Actor degree centrality 
VCbetweenness is Betweenness centrality 
VCInfocentraiity is Information flow centrality 
VCCioseness is Closeness centrality 
VCKpiexRank is K-piex
Note 1 -  Missing data is not actually missing; rather, it means that a VC firm is not connected in the way the 
indices measure. For example, if  the VC firm is an isolate, or a terminus (like the end of a branch on a tree), it 
will not be, for example, befiveen two other VC nodes and therefore will have no betweenness score. In Net2 
missing data also includes the VC firms from N etl not included in the Net2 network.
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Table 4.6
Network variables correlations
Net1 Correlations
VCdegree
1
VCbetwee
nnessi
VCInfoce
ntralityl
VCCIose
nessi
VCkplexR
anki
VCdegreel Pearson Correlation 1 882 .794 .948 .793
VC1 Pearson Correlation .882 1 .566 .781 .531
VCInfocentralityl Pearson Correlation .794 .566 1 .898 .904
VCCIosenessI Pearson Correlation .948 .781 .898 1 .869
VCkplexRankI Pearson Correlation .793 .531 .904 .869 1
Ai! correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
N=31,084 ties
Net2 Correlations
VCdegree
1
VCbetwee
nnessi
VCInfoce
ntralityl
VCCIose
nessi
VCkplexR
anki
VCdegreel Pearson Correlation 1 .831 .807 .872 .740
VC1 Pearson Correlation .831 1 .506 .686 .379
VCInfocentralityl Pearson Correlation .807 .506 1 .900 .907
VCCIosenessI Pearson Correlation .872 .686 .900 1 .842
VCkplexRankI Pearson Correlation .740 .379 .907 .842 1
All correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
N=13,495 ties
Networks can often be broken down into components, meaning there are hubs of 
activity that are not connected to other hubs, so the component size distribution is 
reported. In N etl, 271 VC firms (92.2%) are connected to each other in one component. 
Because there are there 3 dyadic groups connected only to each other, and 17 isolates not 
connected to anyone, the other components have only 1 or 2 VC firms in each one. This 
translates into one very large macro component having almost all of the VC firms as 
members. The remaining components are tiny, with only 1 or 2 members. Because these 
smaller components have so few members, they cannot be compared to the larger
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component. There is insufficient statistical power to do these comparisons. This affects 
some of the hypotheses because the a priori assumption was that multiple components 
could he compared. Another consequence of having essentially one densely 
interconnected component is the resulting lack of variance within many o f the network 
variables, which makes it harder to find significance when using these variables to predict 
the outcome variable. Net2 also has one main component; however, it is somewhat less 
dense. There are four dyads, one group of 4, and no isolates. Again, it is not he possible 
to compare the smaller components against the larger one due to the lack of statistical 
power. Table 4.7 shows the component makeup.
8 0
Table 4.7
Component makeup of the network 
Number o f components and number of venture capitalists in each component
N e tl vccompno
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid 1 271 92.2 92.2 92.2
2 2 .7 .7 92.9
3 2 .7 .7 93.5
4 2 .7 .7 94.2
5 1 .3 .3 94.6
6 1 .3 .3 94.9
7 1 .3 .3 95.2
8 1 .3 .3 95.6
9 1 .3 .3 95.9
10 1 .3 .3 96.3
11 1 .3 .3 966
12 1 .3 .3 969
13 1 .3 .3 97.3
14 1 .3 .3 97.6
15 1 .3 .3 98.0
16 1 3 .3 98.3
17 1 .3 .3 986
18 1 .3 .3 99.0
19 1 .3 .3 993
20 1 .3 .3 99.7
21 1 .3 .3 100.0
Total 294 100.0 100.0
Net2 vccompno
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid 1 175 936 936 936
2 2 1.1 1.1 94.7
3 2 1.1 1.1 95.7
4 2 1.1 1.1 96.8
5 2 1.1 1.1 97.8
6 4 2.1 2.1 100.0
Total 187 100.0 100.0
VCcompno is the number of components in VC network 
Frequency is the number of VC firms in each component
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The graphical representation of the network itself show visually what the 
frequency distribution, component numbers, and log transformation represent. Both Netl 
and Net2 show one large network component. Only a very small number of VC firms are 
not included in the main component. (See Figure 4.1.)
Degree reduction (deleting network ties whose removal does not fundamentally 
alter the underlying structure of the network) of Netl ties was performed multiple times 
to try to make the Netl structure more visible. The Kamadi-Kawaii algorithm 
transformation removed some ties and repositioned the nodes to make the underlying 
structure more visible. This reveals that there is one large component with approximately 
15 embedded, overlapping hubs, although statistically these hubs could not be identified 
as separate clusters within the component. Even with degree reduction, these hubs still 
are very interconnected with the other hubs. This embeddedness means that it is very 
easy for information to reach others in the network, that all the network measures have 
very little variance, and that venture capitalists’ position in the network is less likely to 
matter when it comes to the flow of information though the network. Net2 is less dense 
on the network edges, making it easier to see the structure without doing a 
transformation. Again there appear to be some overlapping hubs but these cannot be 
identified statistically.
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Figure 4.1
N e tl
Graphie representation of the network
(a) Entire network (Dots are individual venture capitalists; lines are the links between
them)
o
83
Figure 4.1, continued
(b) Same network, isolates and dyads removed, after 3 rounds of degree reduction and 
repositioning nodes using the Kamadi-Kawaii algorithm
(c) Further degree reduction (8 more rounds)
84
Figure 4.1, continued
(d) Same level of reduction as in (c) with nodes repositioned to make more visible the
extensive interconnections
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Figure 4.1, continued
Net2
The larger the node circle, the more ties the VC firm has with other VC firms. The 
colors are consistent across circle size.
8 6
Hypotheses Results
The hypotheses were tested using regression using SAS, PROC GLM, which uses 
least squares to fit the linear model. PROC GLM is not ideally designed for categorical 
dependent variables. A logistic regression (PROC CATMOD) would have been the better 
choice. When this was attempted, every previously discussed limit of the program was 
encountered. As a result the tests of the hypotheses, using regression, should be viewed 
as preliminary and exploratory.
The dependent variable, escalation of commitment, is a categorical variable with 
three categories. Successful outcomes (IPO, merger, acquisition) were dummy coded 1 
and represents good decision-making. Another good decision, dummy coded 2 was the 
decision to stop funding a failing company after 1 or 2 rounds of funding. Dummy coded 
3 was the escalation of commitment case. These are the companies that received more 
than 2 rounds of funding and ultimately failed.
The analyses were only performed using the VC firms in the large component.
The VC firms in either network who where not included in this component were so few
in number that there was not enough statistical power to contrast these small clusters of
VC firms against the main component. In addition, including VC firms disconnected
from the main component makes no theoretical sense because they would not be involved
in any information flow that took place in the main component.
Hypothesis la: VC firms connected to primarily inexperienced or very
experienced VC firms will escalate more than those with a higher 
number of connections to VC firms with 12-15 years of 
experience.
This hypothesis predicted a curvilinear relationship between the experience of the 
advice network VC firms and escalation. Shepherd, et al. (2002) found that additional
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experience improved inexperienced venture capitalists’ decision-making processes up to 
a point. They documented that venture capitalists’ decision accuracy increased over time, 
with decision accuracy peaking at 12-15 years of experience. After this time period, good 
decision-making decreased somewhat. Although these researchers were looking at the 
experience level of the focal VC firm rather than the kinds of advice a VC firm would 
give hased on their experience level, their results do have some bearing on the advice 
network. Presumably a VC firm’s decision-making quality would influence the quality of 
the advice they could give others. As a result it is expected that there would he a 
curvilinear relationship between quality of advice as inferred from the experience level of 
the advice network VC firm and the tendency to escalate commitment. When the advice 
network VC firms had a midrange of experience, they were expected to escalate 
commitment less than the advice networks made up of VC firms with more experienced 
or less experience.
The experience level of the focal VC firm was also included because of the direct 
effect of experience on focal VC firm decision-making quality. In the regression equation 
the variable VCAgel is the years of experience the focal VC firm had at the time of the 
first round of funding of the focal start-up company. VCAge2 is the years of experience of 
each VC firm in the focal VC firm’s advice network. The number of companies that a VC 
firm funded prior to 1990, VCNumCompaniesHistl, the number of companies that a VC 
firm funded prior to 1990, is another measure of experience for the VC firms.
Although the model was significant (Netl F=39.32, p<.0001 and Net2 F=25.40, 
p<.0001), the hypothesis was not supported in either analysis due to the lack of a 
curvilinear relationship. With both Netl and Net2, it appears that what is of primary
8 8
importance is the collective experience level of the VC firms as measured hy the number 
of companies funded in the past {VCNumCompaniesHistl). In addition, this variable 
interacted with the age of the focal VC firm (VCAgel) hut not with the age of the VC 
firms in the advice network (VCAge2). The more companies a focal VC firm had funded 
in the past slightly increased the tendency to escalate (Netl beta coefficient = -.00039 and 
Net2 beta coefficient = -.00513). That effect went away, however, when this variable was 
combined with the actual age of the focal VC firm. The older the VC firm was and the 
more companies it had funded in the past, the less likely it was to escalate. VC firm age 
in years was not significant, nor was the age of the VC firms in the advice network. The 
amount of variance explained is very small: 0.0126% in N etl and 0.0169 inNet2. (See 
Table 4.8).
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Table 4.8
Ho: la. VC Firm experience and escalation
Netl The GLM Procedure
Dependent Variable: CoEscalate
Source DF
Sum of 
Squares Mean Square F Value Pr > F
Model 7 193.74962 27.67852 39.32 <.0001
Error 21509 15139.42489 0.70386
Corrected Total 21516 15333.17451
R-Square
0.012636
Coeff Var 
53.13487
Root MSE 
0.838966
CoEscalate Mean 
1.578938
Source DF
VCAgel
VCAge2
vcNumcompani esHi stl 
VCAgel*VCAge2 
vcAgel*vcNumcompani e 
VCAge2*VCNumCompani e 
VCAg e 1* VCAg e 2 VC N u mC
Type III SS Mean square F Value Pr > F
1 0.46683179 0.46683179 0.66 0.4154
1 0.01354246 0.01354246 0.02 0.8897
1 20.18151966 20.18151966 28.67 <.0001
1 1.48817709 1.48817709 2.11 0.1459
1 19.13695855 19.13695855 27.19 <.0001
1 0.03821903 0.03821903 0.05 0.8157
1 0.31390810 0.31390810 0.45 0.5043
Parameter Estimate
Standard
Error t Value Pr > 1t 1
Intercept 1.569424475 0.03675455 42.70 <.0001
VCAgel -0.002192334 0.00269198 -0.81 0.4154
VCAge2 -0.000303364 0.00218706 -0.14 0.8897
vcNumcompani esHi stl -0.003908855 0.00072999 -5.35 <.0001
VCAgel"VCAge2 0.000234302 0.00016114 1.45 0.1459
VCAgel-vcNumcompanie 0.000216992 0.00004162 5.21 <.0001
VCAge2-vcNumcompanie -0.000010562 0.00004532 -0.23 0.8157
VC Ag e 1 " VC Ag e 2 - VC N u mC -0.000001689 0.00000253 -0.67 0.5043
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Table 4.8, continued
Net2 The GLM Procedure
Dependent Variable: CoEscalate
Source DF
Sum of 
Squares Mean Square F Value Pr > F
Model 7 126.309328 18.044190 25.40 <.0001
Error 10333 7341.972850 0.710536
Corrected Total 10340 7468.282178
R-Square
0.016913
Source DF
VCAgel 
VCAge2
VCNumCompani esHi stl 
VCAgel*VCAge2 
vcAgel*vcNumcompani e 
VCAge2*VCNumCompani e 
VCAg e 1* VCAg e 2 VC N u mC
Parameter
Intercept 
VCAgel 
VCAge2
VCNumCompani esHi stl 
VCAgel*VCAge2 
VCAgel"VCNumCompanie 
VCAge2"VCNumCompani e 
VC Ag e 1 " VC Ag e 2 " VC N u mC
Coeff Var Root MSE CoEscalate Mean 
52.85455 0.842933 1.594817 
Type III SS Mean square F value Pr > F
1 3.04657264 3.04657264 4.29 0.0384
1 1.85641459 1.85641459 2.61 0.1060
1 11.92503789 11.92503789 16.78 <.0001
1 5.38917154 5.38917154 7.58 0.0059
1 13.30853831 13.30853831 18.73 <.0001
1 0.00821165 0.00821165 0.01 0.9144
1 1.46529677 1.46529677 2.06 0.1510
Estimate
Standard
Error t Value Pr > |t|
1.684568756 0.06633566 25.39 <.0001
-0.009702098 0.00468547 -2.07 0.0384
-0.005924533 0.00366530 -1.62 0.1060
-0.005132731 0.00125289 -4.10 <.0001
0.000722218 0.00026224 2.75 0.0059
0.000304779 0.00007042 4.33 <.0001
0.000007697 0.00007160 0.11 0.9144
-0.000005640 0.00000393 -1.44 0.1510
VCAgel = age of the VC firm
VCAge2 = age of the VC firm’s advice network (direct tie)
VCNumCompaniesHistl = the number of companies the VC firm has funded in the past
Hypothesis lb: Syndicates with more VC firms with more industry relevant
experience will escalate less than those with less past experience in 
that industry.
De Clerc (2002) found that it was a venture capitalist’s knowledge of a specific 
industry and previous investment history that affected future outcomes. These results 
were attributed to the added value a venture capitalist brings to an entrepreneurial 
company with regards to VC oversight, involvement with entrepreneur’s strategic 
decisions, connections, and credibility. The absorptive capacity literature has documented 
that the greater the overlap of the knowledge base of parties involved in a project the
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greater the learning and the greater the new knowledge creation (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990). The logical extension would be to expect that the greater the knowledge the better 
the advice and the greater the industry relevant experience the better the advice. As a 
result greater industry relevant experience was expected to decrease escalation.
This hypothesis is mostly supported. Experience in the same industry, as 
measured by the number of companies funded and the percentage of total companies 
funded, was significant (Netl F=65.96, p<.0001 and Net2 F=38.54, p<.0001). For Net 1 
greater experience in the same industry, as determined by a count of the number of past 
companies funded in that industry, decreased escalation (beta coefficient is .008,
0<.0001) as expected. Unexpectedly when looking at the percent of companies funded in 
the same industry (percentage out of the total number of companies funded in the past), 
the higher the percentage funded in the industry the greater the escalation (beta 
coefficient is -.0011).
When looking at related industry experience, the more related industry experience 
a VC firm had, the greater the escalation of commitment (beta coefficient is -0415, 
p<.0001). Again, unexpectedly the greater percent experience in the related industry 
decreased escalation of commitment (beta coefficient is .0026, p<.0001). The opposite 
was true with experience in unrelated industries. Unexpectedly the greater the umelated 
industry experience the less the escalation of commitment (beta coefficient is .0167, 
p<0001). As expected, the higher the percentage of unrelated experience the greater the 
escalation of commitment (beta coefficient is -.00107).
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The Net2 had exactly the same pattern of results and the beta coefficients were 
almost identical. In both networks the amount of variance explained was small, In Netl 
the R squared was .01257 and for Net2 it was .01685. (See Table 4.9).
Table 4.9
Ho: lb, VC Firm industry and escalation
Netl The GLM Procedure
Dependent Variable: CoEscalate
Source 
Model 
Error
Corrected Total
R-Square 
0.012573
Source
VCSameHi stl 
vcsameHi stPctl 
VCRelatedHi stl 
VCRelatedHi stPctl 
vcunrelatedHi stl 
vcunrelatedHi stPctl
Sum of
DF Squares Mean Square F Value Pr > F
6 282.73536 47.12256 65.96 <.0001
31080 22204.31163 0.71442
31086 22487.04700
Coeff Var Root MSE CoEscalate Mean
53.39103 0.845236 1. 583105
DF Type III SS Mean square F Value Pr > F
1 188.6869292 188.6869292 264.11 <.0001
1 17.3950651 17.3950651 24.35 <.0001
1 205.4880753 205.4880753 287.63 <.0001
1 11.2076471 11.2076471 15.69 <.0001
1 103.5972452 103.5972452 145.01 <.0001
1 3.4150062 3.4150062 4.78 0.0288
Parameter Estimate
Standard
Error t Value Pr > |t1
Intercept 1.606384586 0.01047540 153.35 <.0001
vcsameHi stl 0.008215528 0.00050553 16.25 <.0001
vcsameHi stPctl -0.001104806 0.00022390 -4.93 <.0001
VCRelatedHi stl -0.041526156 0.00244854 -16.96 <.0001
VCRelatedHi stPctl 0.002621012 0.00066174 3.96 <.0001
vcunrelatedHi stl 0.016764087 0.00139214 12.04 <.0001
vcunrelatedHi stPctl -0.001071695 0.00049018 -2.19 0.0288
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Table 4.9, continued
Net2 The GLM Procedure
Dependent variable: CoEscalate
Source DF
Sum of 
Squares Mean square E Value Pr > F
Model 6 163.428117 27.238020 38.54 <.0001
Error 13488 9531.725199 0.706682
Corrected Total 13494 9695.153316
R-Square
0.016857
Coeff Var Root MSE CoEscalate Mean
Source
vcsameHi stl 
vcsameHi stPctl 
VCRelatedHi stl 
VCRelatedHi stPctl 
vcunrelatedHi stl 
vcunrelatedHi stPctl
53. 02153 0.840644 1. 585476
DF Type III SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F
1 123.5960054 123.5960054 174.90 <.0001
1 25.3504827 25.3504827 35.87 <.0001
1 119.4582578 119.4582578 169.04 <.0001
1 16.4158975 16.4158975 23.23 <.0001
1 44.0156727 44.0156727 62.28 <.0001
1 0.5066038 0.5066038 0.72 0.3972
Parameter Estimate
Standard
Error t Value Pr > I t  1
Intercept 1.634446940 0.01723263 94.85 <.0001
vcsameHi stl 0.009881483 0.00074719 13.22 <.0001
vcsameHi stPctl -0.002182501 0.00036440 -5.99 <.0001
VCRelatedHi stl -0.047930144 0.00368649 -13.00 <.0001
VCRelatedHi stPctl 0.005452628 0.00113132 4.82 <.0001
vcunrelatedHi stl 0.015724178 0.00199240 7.89 <.0001
vcunrelatedHi stPctl -0.000671996 0.00079368 -0.85 0.3972
Hypothesis Ic: Syndicates with at least one VC firm with 12-15 years experience
with fewer escalation outcomes and more experience in the 
industry of investment will escalate less.
This hypothesis built on the previous two, except that it is looking at the advice 
coming from other syndicate members rather than from the pre-1990 advice network. 
Combining Ho la  and Ho lb, It is expected that a venture capitalist with 12-15 years of 
experience, with a deep knowledge of the investment’s industry and one that had fewer 
investments that resulted in escalation of commitment may give more valuable advice 
than a venture capitalist with less than 12 or more than 15 years of experience or with 
more experience in another industry than the target industry or one with a poorer record 
of controlling escalation. Thus the best advice would be expected from VC firms with 12-
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15 years of experience, with most of that experience in the industry, and who had few 
past escalation outcomes. This is a three way interaction hypothesis.
The hypothesis is significant in the sense that the three-way interaction of 
experience (except it is not a curvilinear relationship as hypothesized), industry related 
experience, and fewer escalation outcomes was found to decrease escalation of 
commitment (Netl F=113.82 p<.0001 and Net2 F=60.46, p<.0001). However the same 
problem with age and experience was present here. Again the curvilinear relationship 
with age is not present; instead, it is it a straight linear relationship. The greater the VC 
firm’s experience in years {Agel), the more experience in the industry as measured hy 
number of companies funded in the past (VCSameHist) and the fewer escalations 
(VCEscalate) the less the syndicate escalates. The three-way interaction accounts for 
more of the variance than any of the other significant terms (Netl mean square is 173.72, 
parameter t = 15.91, p<.0001 and Net2 mean square is 103.02, parameter t = 12.25, 
p<.0001). The amount of variance explained is small (Netl R squared is .0435 and Net2 
R squared is .0515). (See Table 4.10).
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Table 4.10
Ho: le. Experience, industry, and escalation
Netl The GLM Procedure
Dependent Variable: CoEscalate
Source
Model
Error
Corrected Total
R-Square
0.043456
Source
VCAgel 
vcsameHi stl 
vcsameHi stPctl 
vcEscalateHi stl 
VCEscalatePctHi stl 
VCAgel"vcsameHistl 
vcAgel*vcEscalateHi s 
vcsameHi s*VCEscal ate 
VCAgel"VCEscalatePct 
vcsameHi s*vcEscalate 
VCAgel"VCSame-VCEsca
Sum of
DF Squares Mean Square F Value Pr > F
11 859.49338 78.13576 113.82 <.0001
27560 18919.14389 0.68647
27571 19778.63728
Coeff Var Root MSE CoEscalate Mean
52. 33655 0.828536 1. 583092
DF Type III SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F
1 58.5652372 58.5652372 85.31 <.0001
1 12.7616384 12.7616384 18.59 <.0001
1 1.4287737 1.4287737 2.08 0.1491
1 2.5813271 2.5813271 3.76 0.0525
1 16.3048578 16.3048578 23.75 <.0001
1 26.4111261 26.4111261 38.47 <.0001
1 36.7932835 36.7932835 53.60 <.0001
1 98.8082505 98.8082505 143.94 <.0001
1 22.0188928 22.0188928 32.08 <.0001
1 62.6495652 62.6495652 91.26 <.0001
1 173.7244988 173.7244988 253.07 <.0001
Parameter Estimate
Standard
Error t Value Pr > 1t 1
Intercept 1.451933454 0.02136760 67.95 <.0001
VCAgel 0.015603043 0.00168928 9.24 <.0001
vcsameHi stl -0.008563664 0.00198618 -4.31 <.0001
vcsameHi stPctl 0.000423227 0.00029336 1.44 0.1491
VCEscalateHi stl 0.007985739 0.00411817 1.94 0.0525
VCEscalatePctHi stl -0.003512388 0.00072070 -4.87 <.0001
vcAgel-vcsameHistl -0.000465711 0.00007508 -6.20 <.0001
VCAgel-VCEscalateHi s -0.002071018 0.00028289 -7.32 <.0001
vcsameHi s-VCEscalate -0.000603533 0.00005031 -12.00 <.0001
VCAgel-VCEscalatePct 0.000464464 0.00008201 5.66 <.0001
vcsameHi s-VCEscalate 0.000520338 0.00005447 9.55 <.0001
VCAgel-VCSame-VCEsca 0.000048368 0.00000304 15.91 <.0001
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Table 4.10, continued
Dependent variable: CoEscalate
Source
Model
Error
Corrected Total
R-Square
0.051573
Source
VCAgel 
vcsameHi stl 
vcsameHi stPctl 
VCEscalateHi stl 
VCEscalatePctHi stl 
VCAgel"vcsameHistl 
vcAgel*vcEscalateHi s 
vcsameHi s*VCEscal ate 
VCAgel"VCEscalatePct 
vcsameHi s*vcEscalate 
VCAgel"VCSame-VCEsca
Parameter
Intercept 
VCAgel 
vcsameHi stl 
vcsameHi stPctl 
VCEscalateHi stl 
VCEscalatePctHi stl 
vcAgel-vcsameHistl 
VCAgel-VCEscalateHi s 
vcsameHi s-VCEscalate 
VCAgel-VCEscalatePct 
vcsameHi s-VCEscalate 
VCAgel-VCSame-VCEsca
Net2 The GLM Procedure
Sum of
DF Squares Mean square E Value
11 456.738766 41.521706 60.46
12231 8399.411851 0.686731
12242 8856.150617
Coeff Var Root MSE CoEscalate Mean
51.89873 0.828693 1.,596749
DF Type III SS Mean Square F Value
1 35.2899680 35.2899680 51.39
1 3.1810746 3.1810746 4.63
1 0.2378251 0.2378251 0.35
1 2.3618070 2.3618070 3.44
1 1.2711950 1.2711950 1.85
1 19.4374738 19.4374738 28.30
1 22.8101877 22.8101877 33.22
1 52.8773207 52.8773207 77.00
1 9.6772277 9.6772277 14.09
1 18.8047187 18.8047187 27.38
1 103.0161545 103.0161545 150.01
Standard
Estimate Error t Value Pr
Pr > F
<.0001
Pr > F
<.0001
0.0314
0.5562
0.0637
0.1737
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0 .0002
<.0001
<.0001
1.409219751
0.020687871
-0.006446930
0.000257817
0.011076749
-0.001615999
-0.000613910
-0.002416399
-0.000662829
0.000471299
0.000444374
0.000056474
0.03896860
0.00288592
0.00299543
0.00043810
0.00597288
0.00118776
0.00011539
0.00041927
0.00007554
0.00012555
0.00008492
0.00000461
36.16
7.17
-2.15
0.59
1.85
-1.36
-5.32
-5.76
-8.77
3.75
5.23
12.25
|t|
<.0001
<.0001
0.0314
0.5562
0.0637
0.1737
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0002
<.0001
<.0001
Hypothesis 2a: VC firms with less dense networks or with clique-like networks
will he more likely to escalate.
This hypothesis looked at where the venture capitalist was situated in the network 
and whether or not this affected escalation. Previous research documented that groups 
with more ties outperform those with fewer ties (Baldwin, Bedell, & Johnson, 1997; 
Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001). In addition, groups which have ties to other actors 
external to themselves gain access to useful information (Mizurchi, 1996; Anacona & 
Caldwell, 1992). Hansen (1999) documented that tie strength and information complexity
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interact with each other and affect group performance. When complex information is 
needed, a number of redundant strong ties transmitting that information are necessary in 
order for a group to actually use that information. Taken together the literature suggests 
that network centrality indices of a VC firm should affect escalation. It should follow that 
when a VC firm is situated in a less dense area of the network there would be less 
information available and therefore a higher probability of escalation. The reverse should 
hold true when a VC firm is located in a denser, more interconnected part of the network.
This was analyzed using the network measure k-plex, which takes into 
consideration both the density of ties around the focal VC firm and clique-like properties 
of clusters of VC firm ties. The descriptive statistics documented that there were no 
clique like properties within the main component of this network, therefore what 
effectively is being tested is the value of the local VC density around any given VC firm. 
The unit of analysis is at the VC firm tie level. The lower the k-plex rank, the denser the 
network is where the VC firm is located and, presumably, the easier it is for the VC firm 
to access a greater quantity of advice. The variable k-plex was normalized and then 
ranked to try to artificially increase the variance between the VC firms.
For Netl this hypothesis was not supported (F = 0.12, p<.05, adjusted R squared 
is 0.000). This means that being located in a dense area of the network where nearly 
everyone locally is interconnected with each other and has connections to others does not 
(because there is no clique-like tendencies identified in the main component) decrease a 
VC firm’s tendency to escalate commitment to a failing company.
For Net2 the hypothesis was supported (F=24.83, p>.05, adjusted R squared is 
0.001). When a VC firm is located in a less dense area of the network, there is a slight
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tendency to increase escalation of commitment. The explanatory value of the k-plex 
variable is very small: only 0.1% of the variance is explained. Because a higher k-plex 
value means being located in an area of relative lower density, the beta coefficient is 
negative (-0032). (See table 4.11).
Table 4.11
Ho: 2a. K-plex and escalation
Netl The GLM Procedure
Dependent variable: CoEscalate
Source DF
Sum of 
Squares Mean square E Value Pr > F
Model 1 0.12140 0.12140 0.17 0.6821
Error 31082 22486.23798 0.72345
Corrected Total 31083 22486.35938
R-Square Coeff Var Root m s e CoEscalate Mean
0.000005 53. 72746 0.850558 1.583097
Source DF Type III SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F
VCkplexRankl 1 0.12139666 0.12139666 0.17 0.6821
Parameter
Standard
Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 
VCkplexRankl
1.595412188 
-0.000123792
0.03044726
0.00030220
52.40
-0.41
<.0001
0.6821
Net2 The GLM Procedure
Dependent Variable: CoEscalate
Sum of
Source DF Squares
Model 1 17.813878
Error 13485 9674.938550
Corrected Total 13486 9692.752428
Mean Square 
17.813878 
0.717459
F Value Pr > F
24.83 <.0001
R-Square
0.001838
Coeff Var 
53.41761
Root MSE 
0.847030
CoEscalate Mean 
1.585675
Source
VCkplexRankl
DF
1
Type III SS
17.81387794
Mean Square
17.81387794
F Value Pr > F
24.83 <.0001
Parameter
Intercept 
VCkplexRankl
Estimate
1.768718484
-0.003237223
Standard
Error
0.03745151
0.00064967
t Value
47.23
-4.98
Pr > |t|
<.0001
<.0001
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Hypothesis 2b: VC firms are located in a more densely interconnected portion of
the network and they themselves are more densely connected to 
other VC firms, will be less likely to escalate.
This is an interaction hypothesis looking at the various measures of the 
interconnections (centrality measures) between the VC firms funding the company (in the 
regression these are variables with VCl in them), the VC firms they are directly linked to 
in the network (these are the VC2 variables) and escalation of commitment.
As stated previously, the different measures of centrality measure slightly 
different aspects of the ease or difficulty of accessing information that is available in the 
network. These measures are based on the structural configuration of the network. Ideally 
it would have been possible to include all measures of centrality in the same regression 
equation. This would give the most complete information about the access an individual 
VC firm has to advice. Due to the colinearity problems referred to earlier, it was not 
possible to test all centrality measures in the same regression equation. Instead a number 
of regression equations were run, grouping together the centrality measures without 
colinearity problems.
Theoretically when a VC firm and the VC firm’s advice network all have high 
actor degree centrality, high betweenness centrality, high information flow centrality, low 
closeness centrality (is an inverse score) and low k-plex rank centrality (low is denser) 
this would reduce escalation of commitment.
For Netl,all the regression equations were significant. Most of the measures of 
centrality were significant for the focal venture capital firm and to a lesser extent, for the 
VC firm’s advice network. The interaction of the centrality measure between the focal 
VC firm and the advice network was generally significant. The directions were not
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always in the predicted direction. Sometimes the term was significant in one equation but 
not in another. Taken together, these results indicate that centrality in a network 
sometimes decreased escalation of commitment, in other cases it made no difference, and 
in yet other cases increased escalation of commitment. N etl results were different than 
Net2 results. With Net2 there were fewer significant results.
The amount of variance explained was very small for either network (NetlR 
squared ranged from .09 to .005, Net2 R squared ranged from.017 to .005). The results 
also indicate that redefining the network to include only links for venture capitalists who 
are in Rounds 1 and 2 deletes important links that are present in the overall network. (See 
Table 4.12.)
For N etl, betweenness centrality was significant for the focal VC firm and 
explained most of the variance. It was not significant for the focal VC firm’s advice 
network nor for the interaction of the VC firm and the advice network. Information 
centrality was significant, but in the wrong direction for the focal VC firm, in the right 
direction for the advice network, and the interaction term was significant in the wrong 
direction. Closeness centrality was not significant for the VC firm, was significant in the 
wrong direction for the network and significant in the right direction for the interaction. 
Degree centrality was significant in the wrong direction for the VC firm, was not 
significant for the advice network and was significant in the right direction for the 
interaction. K-plex was not significant for the VC firm, was significant in the wrong 
direction for the advice network, and significant in the right direction for the interaction.
For Net2 there were far fewer significant results. Betweenness centrality was 
significant in the right direction only for the VC firm. Information flow centrality and
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Closeness centrality were generally not significant. Degree centrality was significant in 
the wrong direction for the VC firm, was not significant for the advice network and was 
significant in the right direction for the interaction. K-plex was not significant for the VC 
firm, was significant in the wrong direction for the advice network and in the right 
direction for the interaction.
Tahle 4.12
Ho: 2h, Network centralitv, VC firm connections, and escalation
Net1
Dependent Variable: CoEscalate
Source
Model
Error
Corrected Total
R-Square
0.017185
Source
VCbetweenl 
vcbetween2 
VClnfocentral i tyl 
VClnfocentral i ty2 
vcclosenessl 
VCCloseness2 
VCbetween-'VCbetweenn 
vcinfocen*vcinfocent 
vcclosene-VCClosenes
Netl The GLM Procedure
Sum of
DF Squares Mean Square F Value Pr > F
9 386.43264 42.93696 60.38 <.0001
31077 22100.61436 0.71116
31086 22487.04700
Coeff Var Root MSE CoEscalate Mean
53.26878 0.843301 1. 583105
DF Type III SS Mean square F Value Pr > F
1 297.8888232 297.8888232 418.88 <.0001
1 0.3530195 0.3530195 0.50 0.4811
1 6.0614577 6.0614577 8.52 0.0035
1 0.5176696 0.5176696 0.73 0.3936
1 2.3893511 2.3893511 3.36 0.0668
1 5.3676919 5.3676919 7.55 0.0060
1 1.0268825 1.0268825 1.44 0.2295
1 0.8409017 0.8409017 1.18 0.2769
1 6.1362893 6.1362893 8.63 0.0033
Parameter
Intercept
VCbetweenl
vcbetween2
VClnfocentralityl
VClnfocentrality2
vcclosenessl
VCCloseness2
VCbetween-VCbetweenn
vcinfocen-vcinfocent
vcclosene-VCClosenes
Estimate
1.75303265
7.62668082
-0.37436791
0.82679746
-0.27531793
-2.44472662
3.99427341
12.64375963
0.36996885
-9.17099882
Standard
Error
0.42573785 
0.37264139 
0.53135145 
0.28319998 
0.32269393 
1.33374544 
1.45387353 
10.52200476 
0.34023202 
3.12209673
t Value
4.12
20.47
-0.70
2.92
-0.85
-1.83
2.75
1.20
1.09
-2.94
Pr > ItI
<.0001
<.0001
0.4811
0.0035
0.3936
0.0668
0.0060
0.2295
0.2769
0.0033
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Table 4.12, continued
Netl The GLM Procedure
Dependent Variable: CoEscalate
Sum of
Source DF Squares
Model 6 88.22807
Error 31080 22398.81893
Corrected Total 31086 22487.04700
Mean Square 
14.70468 
0.72068
F Value Pr > F
20.40 <.0001
R-Square
0.003924
Source
VCdegreel 
vcdegree2 
VClnfocentral i tyl 
VClnfocentral i ty2 
vcdegreel*vcdegreel 
VCbetween*VCbetweenn
Parameter
Intercept 
VCdegreel 
vcdegree2 
VClnfocentralityl 
VClnfocentrality2 
VCdegreel"VCdegreel 
VCbetween-VCbetweenn
Coeff Var 
53.62437
Root MSE 
0.848930
CoEscalate Mean 
1.583105
DF Type III SS Mean square F Value Pr > F
1 7.16331039 7.16331039 9.94 0.0016
1 9.41415485 9.41415485 13.06 0.0003
1 0.00844387 0.00844387 0.01 0.9138
1 0.00000140 0.00000140 0.00 0.9989
1 12.48090716 12.48090716 17.32 <.0001
1 18.91065614 18.91065614 26.24 <.0001
Standard
Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
1.73266848 0.08517129 20.34 <.0001
-0.00851391 0.00270050 -3.15 0.0016
-0.00214123 0.00059244 -3.61 0.0003
0.01587334 0.14664576 0.11 0.9138
0.00006056 0.04337926 0.00 0.9989
0.00010853 0.00002608 4.16 <.0001
41.07981830 8.01949959 5.12 <.0001
Dependent Variable: CoEscalate
Netl The GLM Procedure
Sum of
Source DF Squares
Model 6 80.12415
Error 31077 22406.23523
Corrected Total 31083 22486.35938
Mean Square 
13.35403 
0.72099
F Value Pr > F
18.52 <.0001
R-Square
0.003563
Source
VCdegreel 
vcdegree2 
VCkplexRankl 
VCkpl exRanl<2 
vcdegreel*vcdegreel 
VCkplexRa-VCkplexRan
Parameter
Intercept 
VCdegreel 
vcdegree2 
VCkplexRankl 
VCkpl exRanl<2 
VCdegreel"VCdegreel 
VCkplexRa-VCkplexRan
Coeff Var
DF
1
1
1
1
1
1
Root MSE CoEscalate Mean
1.63611 0.849112 1.,583097
Type III SS Mean square F Value Pr > F
4.35081723 4.35081723 6.03 0.0140
0.00271208 0.00271208 0.00 0.9511
0.38516906 0.38516906 0.53 0.4648
3.21808629 3.21808629 4.46 0.0346
14.84620963 14.84620963 20.59 <.0001
5.74811868 5.74811868 7.97 0.0048
Standard
Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
1.591828038 0.07987894 19.93 <.0001
0.004812004 0.00195887 -2.46 0.0140
0.000027075 0.00044145 0.06 0.9511
0.000707033 0.00096734 0.73 0.4648
0.002149748 0.00101755 2.11 0.0346
0.000088484 0.00001950 4.54 <.0001
0.000028566 0.00001012 -2.82 0.0048
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Table 4.12, continued
Dependent variable: CoEscalate
Netl The GLM Procedure
Sum of
Source DF Squares
Model 6 343.48084
Error 31077 22142.87854
Corrected Total 31083 22486.35938
Mean Square 
57.24681 
0.71252
F Value Pr > F
80.34 <.0001
R-Square
0.015275
Coeff Var 
53.31997
Root MSF 
0.844107
CoEscalate Mean 
1.583097
Source DF Type III SS Mean square F Value Pr > F
VCbetweenl 1 41.2116319 41.2116319 57.84 <.0001
vcbetween2 1 0.1470120 0.1470120 0.21 0.6497
VCkplexRankl 1 0.0816404 0.0816404 0.11 0.7350
VCkpl exRanl<2 1 1.2720207 1.2720207 1.79 0.1815
vcbetween*vcbetweenn 1 124.9772523 124.9772523 175.40 <.0001
VCkplexRa-VCkplexRan 1 2.1188566 2.1188566 2.97 0.0846
Standard
Parameter Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1.66267613 0.07894774 21.06 <.0001
VCbetweenl -5.56858897 0.73220510 -7.61 <.0001
vcbetween2 -0.12512147 0.27545649 -0.45 0.6497
VCkplexRankl -0.00028391 0.00083874 -0.34 0.7350
VCkpl exRanl<2 0.00132992 0.00099535 1.34 0.1815
VCbetween-VCbetweenn 93.45024741 7.05606324 13.24 <.0001
VCkplexRa-VCkplexRan -0.00001729 0.00001003 -1.72 0.0846
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Table 4.12, continued
Net2
Net2 The GLM Procedure
Dependent variable: CoEscalate
Source DE
Sum of 
Squares Mean square E Value Pr > F
Model 9 69.338094 7.704233 10.79 <.0001
Error 13485 9625.815222 0.713816
Corrected Total 13494 9695.153316
R-Square
0.007152
Coeff Var 
53.28851
Root MSE 
0.844877
CoEscalate Mean 
1.585476
Source DE Type III SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F
VCbetweennessl 1 45.22499942 45.22499942 63.36 <.0001
VCbetweenness2 1 0.00577909 0.00577909 0.01 0.9283
VClnfocentral i tyl 1 1.57256720 1.57256720 2.20 0.1378
VClnfocentral i ty2 1 1.75281226 1.75281226 2.46 0.1171
vcclosenessl 1 1.38082493 1.38082493 1.93 0.1643
vccloseness2 1 0.55946033 0.55946033 0.78 0.3760
VCbetween-'VCbetweenn 1 2.30285668 2.30285668 3.23 0.0725
VClnfocen*VClnfocent 1 1.78005383 1.78005383 2.49 0.1143
vcclosene*vcclosenes 1 0.31651730 0.31651730 0.44 0.5055
Standard
Parameter Estimate Error t Val ue Pr > 1t 1
Intercept 1.55210230 0.21909535 7.08 <.0001
VCbetweennessl 3.48602607 0.43796019 7.96 <.0001
VCbetweenness2 0.05025729 0.55855086 0.09 0.9283
VClnfocentralityl 0.34259998 0.23082137 1.48 0.1378
VClnfocentrality2 0.40331583 0.25737766 1.57 0.1171
vcclosenessl -1.29080479 0.92807814 -1.39 0.1643
VCCloseness2 0.91270751 1.03095632 0.89 0.3760
VCbetween-VCbetweenn -16.64677621 9.26808421 -1.80 0.0725
VCinfocen-VCinfocent -0.43425258 0.27499141 -1.58 0.1143
vcclosene-VCClosenes -1.97230424 2.96188686 -0.67 0.5055
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Table 4.12, continued
Dependent variable: CoEscalate
Source
Model
Error
Corrected Total
R-Square
0.011882
Source
VCdegreel 
VCdegree2 
VClnfocentral i tyl 
VClnfocentral i ty2 
VCdegreel"VCdegreel 
vcinfocen*vcinfocent
Net2 The GLM Procedure
Sum of
DF Squares Mean square E Value Pr > F
6 115.196895 19.199483 27.03 <.0001
13488 9579.956421 0.710258
13494 9695.153316
Coeff Var Root m s e CoEscalate Mean
53.15551 0.842768 1.585476
DF Type III SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F
1 33.03484356 33.03484356 46.51 <.0001
1 2.14212324 2.14212324 3.02 0.0825
1 3.72473406 3.72473406 5.24 0.0220
1 0.58958140 0.58958140 0.83 0.3623
1 53.40924325 53.40924325 75.20 <.0001
1 1.78005383 1.78005383 2.49 0.1143
Parameter Estimate
Standard
Error t Val ue Pr > 1t 1
Intercept 
VCdegreel 
VCdegreel 
VClnfocentralityl 
VClnfocentrality2 
VCdegreel"VCdegreel 
VClnfocen-VClnfocent
1.639651959
-0.050807578
-0.002978933
0.380114347
0.064745600
0.001281868
-0.43425258
0.08354481
0.00744990
0.00171533
0.16598721
0.07106346
0.00014782
0.27499141
19.63
-6.82
-1.74
2.29
0.91
8.67
-1.58
<.0001
<.0001
0.0825
0.0220
0.3623
<.0001
0.1143
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Table 4.12, continued
Net2 The GLM Procedure
Dependent Variable: CoEscalate
Sum of
Source DF Squares
Model 6 154.277640
Error 13480 9538.474788
Corrected Total 13486 9692.752428
Mean Square 
25.712940 
0.707602
F Value 
36.34
R-Square
0.015917
Source
VCdegreel 
VCdeqree2 
VCkplexRankl 
VCkpl exRanl<2 
VCdegreel"VCdegreel 
VCkplexRa-VCkplexRan
Parameter
Intercept 
VCdegreel 
vcdegree2 
VCkplexRankl 
VCkpl exRanl<2 
VCdegreel"VCdegreel 
VCkplexRa-VCkplexRan
Coeff Var 
53.04938
Root MSE 
0.841191
CoEscalate Mean 
1.585675
Pr > F 
<.0001
DF Type III SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F
1 0.79140832 0.79140832 1.12 0.2903
1 0.00085272 0.00085272 0.00 0.9723
1 2.09332082 2.09332082 2.96 0.0855
1 10.31978033 10.31978033 14.58 0.0001
1 11.94333212 11.94333212 16.88 <.0001
1 11.20084414 11.20084414 15.83 <.0001
Standard
Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
1.683565669 0.08856616 19.01 <.0001
-0.005837664 0.00551993 -1.06 0.2903
-0.000048655 0.00140157 -0.03 0.9723
-0.003254814 0.00189236 -1.72 0.0855
0.008166902 0.00213854 3.82 0.0001
0.000479203 0.00011664 4.11 <.0001
-0.000149828 0.00003766 -3.98 <.0001
Dependent Variable: CoEscalate
Net2 The GLM Procedure
Sum of
Source DF Squares
Model 6 115.828979
Error 13480 9576.923450
Corrected Total 13486 9692.752428
Mean Square 
19.304830 
0.710454
F Value Pr > F
27.17 <.0001
R-Square
0.011950
Source
VCbetweennessl 
vcbetweenness2 
VCkplexRankl 
VCkpl exRanl<2 
vcbetween*vcbetweenn 
VCkplexRa-VCkplexRan
Parameter
Intercept 
VCbetweennessl 
vcbetweenness2 
VCkplexRankl 
VCkpl exRanl<2 
VCbetween-VCbetweenn 
VCkplexRa-VCkplexRan
Coeff Var
DF
1
1
1
1
1
1
Root MSE CoEscalate Mean
;.15619 0.842884 1.,585675
Type III SS Mean square F Value Pr > F
5.72671527 5.72671527 8.06 0.0045
0.90029519 0.90029519 1.27 0.2603
0.30584233 0.30584233 0.43 0.5118
4.94481592 4.94481592 6.96 0.0083
22.09430014 22.09430014 31.10 <.0001
5.38574094 5.38574094 7.58 0.0059
Standard
Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
1.65832358 0.08811721 18.82 <.0001
-2.66185131 0.93755997 -2.84 0.0045
-0.35138950 0.31215075 -1.13 0.2603
-0.00110681 0.00168692 -0.66 0.5118
0.00553021 0.00209621 2.64 0.0083
44.81002335 8.03531872 5.58 <.0001
-0.00010107 0.00003671 -2.75 0.0059
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Hypothesis 2c: VC firms that are not tightly and exclusively connected with only a
small number of other VC firms (i.e., are not in a clique) will 
escalate less.
Consistent with previous research, this hypothesis presumes that the lack of
information variety that exists in a small clique is a disadvantage (Bert, 1992).
Performance is higher when groups have more ties to others that are external to the focal
group (Baldwin, et. ah, 1997; Regans & Zuckerman, 2001) because useful information is
gained when groups have ties to external actors (Mizurchi, 1986; Anacona & Caldwell,
1992). As a result it was expected that those VC firms who were not in a clique would
escalate less than those who were tightly and exclusively connected with only a few
others. This hypothesis carmot be tested. There are too few VC firms that are not part of
the main component, and, therefore, not enough power to do any statistical tests.
Hypothesis 3a: When VC firms work with other VC firms they have worked with
in the past, they will, up to a point, escalate less than if they have 
never worked together. When they work exclusively with each 
other they will escalate more.
There is a significant amount of small group research documenting that 
experience working together is required for smooth group functioning, for productive use 
of conflict over ideas, and for members to be able to take advantage of the skills and 
knowledge of their members. The result of greater experience working together is 
increased group performance, except in cases of overly cohesive groups where 
performance decreases (Arrow & McGrath, 1993; Jenh, 1995, 1997; Birmingham & 
Michaelsen, 1993, Watson, et. ak, 1993, 1991). This hypothesis suggests a curvilinear 
result, presuming some syndicate groups experience group think when they work 
exclusively with each other.
1 0 8
Although there are significant results, the hypothesis is not supported because the 
results are not curvilinear. In N etl, when venture capitalists worked together in the past 
they escalated less (F = 6.33, p>.05); the variance explained, however, is very small 
(adjusted R squared is less than 0.0002). In Net2 this was also true (F = 11.93, p>.05, 
adjusted R squared is .0009). Fhe portion of the hypothesis that addressed working 
exclusively with each other was not tested because there was not enough power to test 
this (only three dyadic groups of venture capitalists in N etl and three dyadic groups and 
one group of four in Net2). (See Tahle 4.13).
Tahle 4.13
Ho: 3a. Working together in the past and escalation
Netl The GLM Procedure
Dependent Variable: CoEscalate
Source DF
Sum of 
Squares Mean Square F Value Pr > F
Model 1 4.58173 4.58173 6.33 0.0118
Error 31085 22482.46526 0.72326
Corrected Total 31086 22487.04700
R-Square Coeff Var Root MSE CoEscalate Mean
0.000204 53. 72008 0.850446 1.583105
Source DF Type III SS Mean square F value Pr > F
VClVC2workedlnPast 1 4.58173334 4.58173334 6.33 0.0118
Parameter
Intercept
vclvc2workedinPast
Estimate
1.591204909
-0.026296293
Standard
Error
0.00579837
0.01044783
t Value Pr > |t |
274.42
-2.52
<.0001
0.0118
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Table 4.13, continued
Net2 The GLM Procedure
Dependent variable: CoEscalate
Sum of
Source DF Squares Mean square F value Pr > F
Model 1 8.566870 8.566870 11.93 0.0006
Error 13493 9686.586446 0.717897
Corrected Total 13494 9695.153316
R-Square Coeff var Root m s e  CoEscalate Mean
0.000884 53.44061 0.847288 1.585476
Source DF Type III SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F
VClVC2WorkedlnPast 1 8.56687027 8.56687027 11.93 0.0006
Standard
Parameter Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
intercept 1.607921318 0.00976802 164.61 <.0001
VClVC2WorkedlnPast -0.050728218 0.01468485 -3.45 0.0006
Hypothesis 3b: Larger groups made up of more venture capitalists who have
worked together in the past will escalate less than larger groups 
made up of fewer venture capitalists who have worked together in 
the past.
Building on the theory used in hypothesis 3a this hypothesis adds group size. 
Larger VC syndicates have other problems with decision-making and problem solving 
(D’Amico, 2002). Previous research on VC firms and escalation documented that larger 
syndicate groups had a tendency to escalate more than smaller syndicate groups 
(Birmingham, et. al.2003). As a result it is expected that large groups with less 
experience working together in the past will be more likely to escalate their commitment. 
Therefore it is expected that the interaction term will be significant.
Although the results are significant, this hypothesis is not supported because in 
both cases the interaction term is not significant. In Netl the interaction term has an F of 
0.07 and in Net2 F it is 1.89. In both cases, working together in the past decreased 
escalation (although Netl p<.06, beta coefficient = -.028012 and Net2 p<.0001, beta
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coefficient = -.072863). In both cases, as the number of VC firms investing in the 
company increased, so did escalation (Netl beta coefficient is .025035 and Net2 beta 
coefficient is .024093). The amount of variance for these results is small (Netl R squared 
is .0896 and Net2 .0936). (See Table 4.14.)
Table 4.14
Ho: 3b. Group size and working together in the past
Netl The GLM Procedure
Dependent Variable: CoEscalate
Source DF
Sum of 
Squares Mean Square F Value Pr > F
Model 3 2015.96612 671.98871 1020.34 <.0001
Error 31083 20471.08088 0.65859
Corrected Total 31086 22487.04700
R-Square Coeff Var Root MSE CoEscalate Mean
0.089650 51.26242 0.811538 1.583105
Source DF Type III SS Mean square F Value Pr > F
VClVC2workedlnPast
CoNofvcs
vclvc2worke*CoNofvcs
1
1
1
2.257295
1377.488542
0.047323
2.257295
1377.488542
0.047323
3.43
2091.56
0.07
0.0641
<.0001
0.7887
Standard
Parameter Estimate Error t value Pr > 1t 1
Intercept 1.300165370 0.00843287 154.18 <.0001
VClVC2workedlnPast -0.028012188 0.01513080 -1.85 0.0641
CoNofvcs 0.025035759 0.00054743 45.73 <.0001
vclvc2worke*CoNofvcs 0.000263278 0.00098217 0.27 0.7887
111
Table 4.14, continued
Dependent Variable: CoEscalate
Net2 The GLM Procedure
Source DF
Sum of 
Squares Mean Square F Value Pr > F
Model 3 907 .635852 302.545284 464.48 <.0001
Error 13491 8787 .517464 0.651361
Corrected Total 13494 9695 .153316
R-Square Coeff var Root MSE CoEscalate Mean
0.093617 50. 90393 0.807070 1. 585476
Source DF Type III SS Mean square F Value Pr > F
VClVC2workedlnPast
CoNofvcs
vclvc2worke"CoNofvcs
1
1
1
7.
478.
1.
8323951
8471231
2327195
7.8323951
478.8471231
1.2327195
12.02
735.15
1.89
0.0005
<.0001
0.1689
Parameter Estimate
Standard
Error t value Pr > 1t 1
Intercept 1.329266293 0.01386341 95.88 <.0001
VClVC2workedlnPast -0.072863895 0.02101242 -3.47 0.0005
CoNofvcs 0.024093317 0.00088861 27.11 <.0001
vclvc2worke"CoNofvcs 0.001862999 0.00135423 1.38 0.1689
VCl VC2WorkedIn Past -  VC firms worked together in the past 
CoNofVCs -  number of VC firms investing in the current start-up company
S u m m ary
In summary, the venture capital firm advice network is very dense and 
information flows freely fhough ouf the network.
Hypothesis la: VC firms connected to primarily inexperienced or very
experienced VC firms will escalate more than those with a higher 
percentage of connections to VC firms with 12-15 years of 
experience.
This hypothesis was not supported, instead there was a linear effect.
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Hypothesis lb: Syndicates with more VC firms with more industry relevant
experience will escalate less than those with less past experience in 
that industry.
This hypothesis was mostly supported.
Hypothesis Ic: Syndicates with at least one VC firm with 12-15 years experience
with fewer escalation outcomes and more experience in the 
industry of investment will escalate less.
This hypothesis was mostly supported.
Hypothesis 2a: VC firms with less dense networks or with clique-like networks
will be more likely to escalate.
This hypothesis was not supported for N etl hut was supported for Net2.
Hypothesis 2b: VC firms located in a more densely interconnected portion of the
network, where they themselves are more densely connected to 
other VC firms, will he less likely to escalate.
This hypothesis received mixed and conflicting results.
Hypothesis 2c: VC firms that are not tightly and exclusively connected with only a
small number of other VC firms (i.e., are not in a clique) will 
escalate less.
This hypothesis could not he tested.
Hypothesis 3a: When VC firms work with other VC firms they have worked with
in the past, they will, up to a point, escalate less than if they have 
never worked together. When they work exclusively with each 
other they will escalate more.
This hypothesis was not supported.
Hypothesis 3b: Larger groups, when made up of more venture capitalists who have
worked together in the past, will escalate less than larger groups 
made up of fewer venture capitalists who have worked together in 
the past.
This hypothesis was not supported.
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While some of the hypotheses concerning advice networks were supported, the 
effect size was small (generally between .01% and 9% of the variance explained). To 
some degree, the support of the various hypotheses, and to a small extent the effect size, 
varied between N etl and Net2. This indicates that how a network is defined affects 
network outcomes. When a network is very dense the network measures have very little 
variance which makes it hard to find significance or much in the way of effect size. In 
addition, with a network as interconnected and dense as this one, the current network 
tools availahle cannot adequately handle these kinds of analyses (Newman, Watts and 
Strogatz, 2002).
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Discussion
This study examined the advice networks of venture capital firms that 
funded new high-technology start-up companies. The source of the data was Thompson 
Financial’s VentureXpert database, which contains information about which VC firms 
funded each start-up company. When the focal VC firm worked with another VC firm 
prior to 1990, the latter VC firm formed part of the focal VC firm’s advice network. 
Characteristics of the VC firm and the various advice network indices attached to the VC 
firm’s position in the network were used to predict escalation of commitment in new 
high-technology start-up companies where the first round of funding was between 1990 
and 1995. Some of the variables were statistically significant predictors of escalation of 
commitment.
There were three major findings. First, the network of VC firms that invest in high 
technology start-ups has become far more interconnected and dense over the last 15 or so 
years. Second, these dense interconnections allow information to flow freely throughout 
the VC network. Third, determining the boundaries of a network and defining its 
membership affect the representation of the underlying network structure. The decision to 
delete ties should be made with caution. A major limitation of this study is that the large 
size and incredibly dense nature of this network overwhelmed the capabilities of the 
existing network analytic tools. Since this potentially compromised the ability to credibly 
analyze the data, the results should be viewed with caution.
Findings
The initial steps in analyzing the network were to create the network from the ties 
observed and then to describe the network. One unexpected finding was that the VC firm
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advice network was extremely dense and that the network had, for all practical purposes, 
only one giant component. Earlier mappings of the VC firm funding network had 
documented regional hubs, such as Silicon Valley and the greater Boston area, with 
limited ties between hubs (Bygrave, 1987; Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). These earlier 
mappings showed a network comprised of many locally dense, almost clique-like 
components. One explanation for the regional nature of network hubs was that venture 
capitalists generally had a very “hands-on” management style with their investments and 
therefore preferred to be physically located near their investments. Another explanation 
was that when a VC firm was located in the same general vicinity as the new start-up and 
of other VC firms it was easier to determine the reputation both of the entrepreneur and 
of other potential investment partners (Bygrave 1987; Bygrave & Timmons, 1992; 
Castilla, 2003; De Clerc, 2002; Ferrary, 2003). Now, nearly 20 years later, the network 
documented in the early research is so dense that regional hubs cannot be statistically 
identified. Instead, the network is composed of one giant, interconnected component. In 
fact, only about 2% of VC firms are not connected to the main component. Clearly, in an 
industry that relies heavily on reputation and trust (Castilla, 2003; De Clerc, 2002; 
Sorenson & Stuart, 2001; Ferrary, 2003), this dense interconnectivity allows information 
about reputation and trustworthiness to flow freely throughout the network.
Changes in coirmiunication technology over the last 20 years may explain why 
this network has become more highly interconnected. The easier it is to conmiunicate, the 
easier it is to have long distance relationships (Licoppe & Smoreda, 2005). Advances in 
communication technology may be partly responsible for the increased number of 
connections between physically distant VC firms. In the past, due to the hands-on nature
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of venture capitalists’ management of new start-ups, VC firms preferred to fund 
companies within a 60-100 mile radius (Bygrave 1987; Bygrave & Timmons, 1992; 
Castilla, 2003; De Clerc, 2002; Ferrary, 2003). Long-distance partnerships may have 
heen originally created due to the need to have a “local” partner for a new-startup when 
the start-up was not in the same geographical vicinity as the focal VC firm. Over time, 
technological changes made these kinds of long distant relationships easier, more 
practical, and therefore more frequent.
As new VC firms join the network, they also may he following the pattern noticed 
in other affiliation networks. New actors tend to attempt to establish ties with the most 
connected actors in the existing network (Davis, Yoo, & Baker, 2003; Barahasi & Albert, 
1999). Certainly the scale-free property of the two networks implies that this holds true 
for the VC networks studied. The largest consequence of the change from regional hubs 
with few cross-huh connections to one large, densely interconnected component is that 
the later configuration allows information to flow freely throughout the network. When 
there is one very dense component, most network variables have little variance. The 
interconnectedness and therefore lack of variance make it harder to predict escalation of 
commitment and may explain why the findings explain very little of the variance.
Due to the generally weak findings and other problems associated with analyzing 
such a dense network, a second approach of modeling the advice network was made. 
Since the decision to fund Round 3 was made by the VC firms in Rounds 1 and 2, the 
advice networks of VC firms funding only the first two rounds were examined. The 
findings for each network were similar but not identical. Although Net2 was less dense
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and interconnected than N etl, it was still a dense, single-component network. However, 
the periphery of the Net2 was more spread out and thus more visible.
The significance of various network measures differed depending on which 
advice network was heing examined. This raises another issue concerning network 
structure. Clearly, the definition of the network is critical when trying to make inferences 
ahout network independent variables.
Despite these problems, however, the analyses the hypotheses analyzed using 
N etl and Net2 did reveal some relationships between the advice networks of VC firms 
and escalation of commitment. Results for the first set of hypotheses based on VC firm 
experience were not unexpected in the sense that past experience has heen found to he 
significant in other studies. Past research has documented an inverted U-shaped curve for 
experience and new start-up company outcomes (Shepherd, Zacharakis, & Baron ,
2003).This research, in contrast, found (hypothesis la), a linear relationship in both Netl 
and Net2. This find implies that decision quality does not drop as VC firms reach a 
certain age level.
One specific finding (hypothesis la) was that the more companies that were 
funded in the past by the advice network VC firms, the more escalation of commitment 
by the focal VC firm. Yet that effect went away when the variable was combined with the 
age of the focal firm. Instead escalation of commitment dropped. It may be that 
experience over time allows for better judgment and so the combination of the two 
factors results in less escalation of commitment. Also, a relatively young VC firm that 
funded a number of companies concurrently would not benefit from the deep learning by 
experience that can develop over a number of years. An older company, provided it has
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funded a number of companies in the past, presumably has a greater pool of wisdom to 
draw upon, which should increase the value of its advice. Age in years also tends to select 
for the more successful firms, which may also explain why age combined with number of 
companies funded helped decrease escalation.
Another explanation for these finding is biases in the database. More successful 
outcomes than unsuccessful ones are in the database, yet the collective VC firm 
experience is the other way around. Because success is over-represented and presumably 
VC firms which are repeatedly unsuccessful go out of business, the VC firms in the 
network may be a group of firms that has been selected for because they have been 
successful in the past and are continuing to be successful in the present.
Experience in the same and in related industries (hypothesis lb), as measured by 
the number of companies invested in previously, was also predictive of escalation of 
commitment. Greater experience in umelated industries was inversely related. This 
finding makes sense, given that experience in the same or related industries would 
increase a VC firm’s knowledge o f industry-specific issues, and thereby increasing its 
absorptive capacity in that industry. The VC firm would have deeper knowledge in the 
industry helping it pick better start-up companies to fund and give better product related 
advice while funding the new start-up. In both networks, greater experience in the same 
industry, as determined by the number of companies funded, was linked to decreased 
escalation. By contrast, there was an increase in escalation when experience was 
measured by the percentage of companies funded. One explanation for this finding might 
be that VC firms could have a similar percentage without having similar experience. For 
example, one VC firm could have funded one company in a particular industry and two
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companies overall, while another firm might have funded ten companies in a particular 
industry and twenty overall. Clearly, while the percentage of companies funded is 
identical, the latter VC firm has greater industry experience.
When looking directly at VC syndicates funding current companies, a three-way 
interaction was found hetween the syndicate’s age, the number of companies funded in 
the past in the same industry, and past escalation history (hypothesis Ic). As noted 
previously, while this research did not find the expected curvilinear relationship with age, 
it appears that the combination of greater age, more experience in the same industry, and 
fewer past escalation outcomes decreases escalation. As mentioned earlier, these 
surviving older, based on founding date, VC firms tend to he firms that are more likely to 
have funded a higher number of successes rather than failures. It is likely that these older 
VC firms have learned how to manage escalation of commitment, as Ross & Staw (1993) 
speculated could happen, which in turn contributed to their survival. O f course, VC firms 
that had escalated substantially in the past were probably under-represented in this study 
since they would be more likely to be out of business. Further research into how VC 
firms recognize that they are funding a failing company and act to terminate the 
investment without escalating would he useful.
The next set of hypotheses (2a, 2h, and 2c) used network indices to predict 
escalation of commitment. Jaaskelainen (2001) found that the different measures of 
centrality in a small VC network measured different aspects of information flow through 
the network. He demonstrated the importance of knowing not just who was in the most 
central unit hut also what the centrality score values were. In general, the outcome for 
N etl and Net2 were not consistent with the Jaaskelainen results. In these advice
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networks, most of the centrality scores’ values (hypotheses 2a and 2h) had only small 
differences and there was only one component, so N etl and Net2 centrality had little 
predictive value. Each of the measures of centrality measures different aspects of the 
same thing. All hut VC degree and VC k-plex had little variance. Together, the results for 
Netl indicate that a number of factors— including the number of direct ties hetween the 
focal VC firm and other VC firms, the degree to which the focal VC firm is the link 
hetween other firms, the ease with which the focal firm can reach ofher nefwork 
members, and the number of more distant VC firms the focal firm can reach via a short 
“path”— all slightly increased the ability to predict escalation of commitment.
Hypothesis 2a, that venture capitalists with less dense networks or with clique- 
like networks would he more likely to escalate, was supported for Net2 hut not for N e tl. 
Net2, although dense, was less so than N etl, and it was easier to visually see a difference 
in the density hetween its core and periphery. As a result, Net2 offered more of an 
opportunity for a VC firm to be located in an area of the network which, although densely 
interconnected, would he comparatively less so than another area such as the core. A 
certain level of differentiation in dense interconnectivity for communication flows may 
be needed to have significant findings. Since Net2 had fewer than half the average 
number of direct ties than N etl, it may demonstrate that a VC firm’s location near a 
dense part of the network makes more of a difference where fewer ties exist.
Furthermore, the difference between N etl and Net2 suggests that the advice network of 
the Round 1 and 2 VC firms makes the difference in recognizing escalation of 
commitment early in the process. By the time other VC firms enter in later rounds of 
funding, the original VC firms may he entrapped into escalation by too many sunk costs
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and the psychological processes outlined by Ross and Staw (1993) in their model utilized 
in this research.
A significant problem associated with hypothesis 2b, which tested all the 
centrality measures, was the extent of the correlation between the various centrality 
measures. Some of the results were conflicting or in the wrong direction. It may be that 
the network is so densely interconnected, with so many alternative paths for information 
to reach any given VC firm, that none of the centrality measures can meaningfully isolate 
particular kinds of centrality effects. Moreover, the measures may all be contaminated by 
the multiple paths information can take to arrive at a particular node and the ease with 
which information travels through the network. The problem could also stem from the 
fundamental difficulty of getting accurate network index values when the program 
creating these values cannot accurately handle a network this large and dense. In either 
case, some of the measures of central location in a network do affect information flow 
and have predictive value.
That the for Net2 differed from those for N etl in some analyses may be due to the 
consequences of changing the underlying network structure by changing the decision rule 
governing which ties to count. In addition, because Net2 VC firms had, on average, far 
fewer ties than N etl VC firms, there were fewer paths for information to flow through. 
The problem with this explanation is that it is likely that some active ties used in 
decision-making were deleted. For example, Net2 VC firms may consult with some VC 
firms present in Netl that are not present in Net2 when Net2 VC firms make decisions. 
Perhaps venture capitalists in Round 3 are consulted and, because they agree to join the 
syndicate, their advice, presumably after due diligence, is to continue funding.
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Unfortunately, there is no way to gather information on the VC firms contacted which 
advised the focal VC firm to cut its losses. The differences hetween the N etl and Net2 
results, along with the lack of consistency with the Jaaskelainen (2001) VC network 
results, should signal that the inclusion or exclusion of particular ties matters a great deal 
and that the manner in which a network, as well as an active tie, is defined is critical.
The last set of hypotheses (3 and 3h) had to do with the VC syndicates 
themselves. The number o f VC firms investing in a company was predictive of escalation 
(hypothesis 3a). This confirmed the tentative finding (p>0.1) of an earlier study 
(Birmingham et al., 2003). Diffusion of responsibility is a likely explanation for this 
finding. Whether or not VC firms had worked with other VC firms in the syndicate in the 
past was significant. There was a linear relationship hetween the extent to which the VC 
firms had worked together in the past and escalation. Consistent with group research the 
more they had worked together in the past the less likely they were to escalate. 
Inconsistent with the group research was that there wasn’t a curvilinear relationship. The 
decrease in escalation would have been expected if VC firms worked exclusively with 
each other and were overly cohesive. Because few VC firms in the data only worked with 
each other repeatedly there was probably no opportunity for these VC firms to develop an 
overly cohesive bond.
The interaction of working together in the past and size of the group investing in 
the new start-up was not significant (hypothesis 3h). It may be that the problems of 
working together in larger groups can overwhelm the advantages of having worked 
together in the past. Alternatively, it could mean that when only some of the firms in the 
VC syndicate had worked together in the past, most or all of the problems inherent in the
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management of new groups and their decision-making processes also afflicted VC 
syndicates.
Theoretically, this research contributes to understanding of advice networks and 
escalation of commitment. Decisions are not made in a vacuum. Advice networks are an 
important part of the venture capital decision-making process. Venture capitalists rely on 
their advice networks for information and advice concerning the viability of new venture 
funding proposals (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). The dense networks and the resultant 
information flow through them contribute to improved decision-making by making public 
the private information about reputations of other venture capitalists, VC firms, and 
entrepreneurs (Castilla, 2003; Ferrary, 2003). This research documents another way 
advice networks influence investment outcomes. Access to experienced venture 
capitalists with significant industry-related experience that have escalated in the past and 
are central in the network gives access to advice that decreases the tendency for a VC 
syndicate to escalate its commitment to a failing venture. Discovering how experienced 
VC firms recognize the potential for escalation and cut their losses without escalating 
would be important in further understanding how people learn (or not) from escalation 
experiences. A related need is to discover what aspects of the advice from experienced 
VC firms help a VC syndicate to avoid escalation itself.
Several practical implications for VC firms come from this study. The first is that 
the tendency to escalate commitment to a failing new start-up is influenced, to a small 
degree, by the advice received from other VC firms. VC firms with more industry-related 
experience that had escalated commitment in the past gave better advice to prevent 
escalation of commitment than those firms with less experience or those which had not
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escalated their commitment in the past. Presumably market forces have, at least to some 
degree, selected for VC firms that have learned to manage escalation. The increased 
absorptive capacity of experienced VC firms operating in the same and related industries 
increases the value of their advice. Greater advice network’s interconnectivity should 
facilitate the information flow. VC firms need to use this interconnectivity finding to their 
advantage when they choose their advice sources. Identifying which firms are located in 
the most advantageous network locations and creating ties to those firms should increase 
a focal VC firm’s access to quality advice. The result should he that VC firms are then 
able to decrease the risk of escalating their commitment to a failing start-up.
Limitations
There are limits to using secondary data, even though using secondary data to 
document links hetween actors is a common practice in network analysis because o f the 
likelihood of having fewer missing nodes and ties. For instance, secondary data does not 
make it possible to determine which historical ties are now “broken” and no longer in 
use. This study presumed that all ties from pre-1990 were still active for new start-ups 
that received their first round of funding between 1990 and 1995. This assumption was 
probably not accurate for some ties, although it is likely that most ties were still active. 
The data covered the period from ahout 1975 forward. As most VC syndicates last 10-12 
years and the period of interest started in 1990, the 15-year time lag from the beginning 
of most of the historical advice network data to 1990 is, comparatively speaking, not very 
long ,. Directly asking venture capitalists within a firm to identify which other VC firms 
they use for advice would solve that problem.
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A second issue with using secondary data to infer active ties is that of actors’ 
cognitive limits. It is not clear how many active ties one individual can maintain. This has 
heen examined in the context of corporate hoard interlocks. The substantial costs 
associated with hoard membership and the costs of maintaining these ties create a 
practical limit on the number of active hoard ties an individual can maintain. There are 
time demands, frequent face-to-face meetings, and other social interaction requirements 
that represent a significant commitment of time, money and opportunity costs (Davis et 
al., 2003; Newman, Watts & Strigatz, 2002; Gifford, 1997). Newman et al. (2002), using 
the data of Davis et al. (2003), have documented how the number of ties hetween hoard 
members obeys the power law (i.e., data falls on a linear line on a logarithmic scale) and 
then drops off exponentially after ahout 10 ties. Whenever there are costs to adding or 
maintaining links, this cut-off to the power law trend is apparent. When the costs are high 
enough, this power law trend disappears completely (Amaral, Scala, Barthélémy & 
Stanley, 2000).
The power law is obeyed, although with less dramatic decay, in VC firm-to-fimi 
network ties (see Table 4.3). The inclusion of broken links may contribute to the less 
dramatic decay of the power law trend. Maintaining the multiplex ties that are the norm 
in venture capitalist relationships is also very time consuming. Venture capitalist social 
and business ties are intertwined, and both are important (Castilla, 2003; De Clerc, 2002; 
Sorenson & Stuart, 2001; Ferrary, 2003). As a result, there may also he a practical limit 
to the number of current advice network ties an individual venture capitalist can keep 
active. For a small number of firms in the VentureXpert database, Thompson Financial 
lists the VC firms with which the focal VC firm partnered most often. It may be that these
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are the firms that make up the critical component of the VC advice network and that other 
VC firms in the network are consulted less frequently, or not at all.
Many of the unsuccessful start-ups are missing from the database entirely. This 
gap can be inferred from the outcome statistics. This group of 498 VC firms had 62.4% 
successful outcomes, whereas other research has documented approximately a 33.3% 
success rate in the VC industry (Grompers & Terner, 2001). Presuming that Grompers & 
Terner’s percentage is correct, it means that approximately 239 unsuccessful start-ups are 
missing from Thompson Financial’s VentureXpert database, a huge gap which obviously 
biases the sample towards success. If there really are 239 missing firms it also means 
that, as complete as this network is, there are still missing ties. The amount of presumed 
missing data (about 32.4% of what would have been an n of around 737) means that is 
not possible to determine which VC firms partnered most often with which other VC 
firms. This also suggests that the advice network under study is not complete, even 
though it is very dense and large.
Related to the issue of network definition is the issue of the level of analysis at 
which ties should be identified. For instance, the advice network of a specific venture 
capitalist employed by a VC firm may be more important than VC firm-to-fimi ties. A 
focal venture capitalist who does not have any firsthand experience with a peer at another 
VC firm may be less likely to consult that VC firm for advice even when there is a fimi- 
to-firm tie. In addition, the advice network internal to the particular VC firm may be 
critical in very large VC firms. Unfortunately, the database does not contain the 
information to create these intra- and inter-firm individual-to-individual ties.
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Another issue with creating an advice network from affiliation ties is that the 
different kinds of advice obtained from different relationships may connect different 
people (Cross, Borgatti, & Parker, 2001).This study presumed that advice would be 
obtained by one class of actors, collectively measured as the VC firm. Be that as it may, 
the advice “rolodex” of venture capitalists includes others besides VC firms (Bygrave & 
Timmons, 1992).
A related limit is that the structural approach to an advice network only models 
the “pipes” (the ties) between venture capitalists and does not look at what “flows 
through the pipes” (the advice). While the value of the advice received can be inferred to 
some degree by the experience of the VC firm giving the advice, actually finding out 
which VC firms a venture capitalist goes to for which kinds of advice would be a more 
accurate way to model an advice network. Unfortunately this kind of information is very 
difficult to obtain.
Clearly, the criteria used and the information available affect the structure of the 
VC firm advice network. Ideally, asking all the venture capitalists in each VC firm to 
name not only their sources of advice (remembering that not all of these sources will be 
other venture capitalists) but also the individual venture capitalists and VC firms with 
whom they are affiliated would largely address these concerns. In addition, obtaining 
information missing from the database about those investments that failed would increase 
the accuracy of many of the variables used in this study. The networks created by 
addressing either of these concerns would look different, and as such, would result in 
different outcomes than those found in this study.
1 2 8
As previously stated, the primary reason that two versions of the VC firm advice 
networks were analyzed in this study had to do with the extreme interconnectivity of the 
networks. On one hand, the extreme interconnectivity of the network is an interesting 
finding. On the other hand, it also means there is insufficient power to contrast one part 
of the network against another. In addition, other analysis problems are associated with 
this extreme density. Most networks about which researchers have gathered information 
are relatively sparse compared to this network (Newman et ah, 1999). As a result, the 
network analysis tools currently available are unable to handle, in a sophisticated or even 
an accurate way, networks of this density (Boyd, Fitzgerald, & Beck, 2006; Moody, 
2001). Identifying local clusters/hubs/components becomes difficult using the available 
tools. When the network is so large and dense that most of the nodes are located close to 
each other, current tools are computationally inefficient, fail to identify clusters, or both. 
Only if  these clusters are identified can previously developed measures be applied to 
analyze them (Boyd, Fitzgerald, & Beck, 2006; Moody, 2001).
The inability to identify clusters using available network analysis tools is exactly 
what happened when analyzing the VC advice networks. One giant component was 
identified. In the complete network (Netl), after tie reduction, about 15-18 local centers 
of density/clusters/hubs were visually identified. The centers could not be identified 
statistically, however, because they were too interconnected with the rest of the network. 
In the smaller VC network (Net2), these 15 or so clusters were more apparent and the 
edges of the component were more spread out, but again there was no statistical 
identification of what might be smaller hubs. These smaller possible hubs might represent 
regional concentrations of VC firm/entrepreneur activity, such as Silicone Valley.
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Unfortunately such identification is impossible because the database, while including 
addresses for most VC firms, generally did not include address for their satellite offices. 
Another possible explanation is that these clusters were driven by specific VC firm major 
players, since some VC firms are very large with projects all over the United States. Each 
cluster could represent a major VC firm and the physically local and more distant ties it 
created in order to more efficiently invest in new start-ups nationwide. Again, because 
multiple components were not identified, it is not possible to identify particular VC firms 
as centers embedded in the nexus of relationships.
Another approach might have been to compare the core of the network with the 
periphery. Unfortunately, this too has its problems. In a network of any size, there is no 
efficient way to determine the optimal way to partition the core relative to the periphery. 
The problem is akin to that of identifying clusters/components in a large, dense network. 
If no a priori reason exists for a decision rule to partition the network into specific 
definable components or a clearly defined core/periphery dichotomy, then the available 
techniques to do so are overwhelmed by the sheer size of the problem of trying to find the 
optimal core/periphery structure (Borgatti & Everett, 1999; Boyd, Fitzgerald, & Beck, 
2006). In addition, UCINET is known to give incorrect answers when trying to identify 
components and core/periphery structure with large, dense networks (Boyd, et ah, 2006; 
Moody, 2001). Furthermore, UCINET has no back-up valid statistical test in place to use 
when the first method encounters problems. Unfortunately, neither does any other 
established network analysis program (Boyd et ah, 2006). Boyd et al. (2006) did use a 
modified Keringham-Lin algorithm using Mathematica with some success in smaller
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(twelve different 8 x 8  matrices) dense networks, however, Mathematica can not handle 
networks as large as the one in this study (a nearly 300 x 300 matrix).
A further issue with these findings is that the amount of variance explained is not 
large. The power of a large n may have made it possible to find statistical significance 
where, on a practical level, the amount of variance explained is quite small. Alternatively, 
the statistical problems encountered in analyzing the network to begin with resulted in 
network indices that were not very accurate. The issues raised by the problems 
encountered when analyzing a dense, large network casts a shadow on the usefulness of 
the values assigned to the network variables for each VC firm. On the other hand, the 
problems of successfully managing a new start-up and bringing the investment to a 
successful conclusion are complex; a whole host of variables are involved in nurturing a 
new venture from start-up to a successful IPO. This study examined only a small part of a 
very complex set of processes that unfold over time. The small amount of variance 
explained could be correct despite the analysis problems. Clearly more work remains to 
be done.
Further Research Questions
A number of questions are left unanswered by this research, and additional 
research questions are suggested by it. Some of the methodological questions have heen 
discussed in detail previously. A more accurate way to uncover hubs/clusters/components 
in large, dense networks is needed. More work is needed on how network definition 
amongst the same set of actors affects the network structure and, therefore, the outcomes. 
At what point in time should a historical tie he considered to he “broken” and deleted 
from the network?
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The extent of the current interconnectivity between VC firms is a useful finding. 
Further research into how and what information flows through these connections, and 
how this density makes information public to the VC firms, could shed light on the nature 
of the extensive cooperation between VC firms. Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002), for 
example, found that syndication helped VC firms make better initial investment decisions 
and find better investments than they could do on their own. Information sharing is also a 
major reason for syndication (Bygrave, 1897; Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). As a result, 
creating the advice networks of each VC firm using snowball sampling and then 
gathering information about what kinds of information flow through the network 
structure could be a useful way to approach studying the questions asked in this study.
Research with primary data is needed to define an advice network with venture 
capital firms. Such research should resolve whether the proxies used with secondary data 
accurately reflect important advice network considerations. What, if  any, are the 
cognitive limits to the number of ties a VC firm can effectively manage? There appears to 
be a limit to the number of new start-ups a venture capitalist can affectively manage at 
once (Jaaskelainen, Mania, & Seppa, 2003). There is probably a limit to the number of 
active ties that can be effectively maintained as well.
While the VC firm advice network used prior to the decision to invest in a new 
start-up has heen the subject of considerable research, the advice networks used after the 
decision to invest have not been subjected to as much scrutiny. To what extent is the 
advice network internal to the VC firm important? To what extent are the ties of 
individual venture capitalists within a firm more or less important than the more general 
firm to firm ties in influencing whether a given VC firm is consulted? If the specific
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individual making contact is unknown to the focal venture capitalist within the latter firm, 
does a consultation take place only after an internal network tie advises contact? What 
kinds of advice come from what sources? At what points in the process does a VC firm 
seek different sources of advice? How are those sources of advice found? Does one 
measure of centrality better predict the ability of a venture capitalist to find certain kinds 
of advice than other measures of centrality? Does finding different kinds of advice 
sources work in ways similar to the manner in which strategic partnership partners are 
found, or is there some other mechanism?
How can a new VC firm break into the existing network and quickly take 
advantage of information flow? Does it matter with whom the VC firm makes its initial 
contact and where that contact is located in the network? These later questions bring up 
the temporal nature of advice networks. What causes VC firms to become more densely 
interconnected or less densely interconnected over time? How do these issues affect new 
start-up company success and VC firm escalation o f commitment? It would he of interest 
to see if newer, less experienced VC firms invite more established VC firms into later 
rounds of funding when they are funding a “winner” in order to try to create this kind of 
connection. If the more experienced VC firm agrees to join, the implied social contract of 
reciprocity may make it more likely that the established firm will later extend favors to 
the less experienced one. Since VC firms can fund only a small percentage of the 
proposals that cross their desks, one such favor might he offering the newer VC firm 
access to a promising proposal that the more experienced VC firm is unable to fund.
Other benefits to the newer firm might include access to advice and assistance not only
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from the experienced VC firm but also from the experienced firm’s other advice network 
members.
The questions related to escalation of commitment and advice networks can he 
better answered when some of the previously mentioned issues have heen addressed. 
What actors are best positioned to give advice to help prevent escalation of commitment? 
This research implies that it would he an experienced VC firm that learns from its 
mistakes, has industry-specific experience, and has escalated in the past. How did the 
experienced VC firm learn to manage escalation? What signals does it now pay attention 
to that trigger it to terminate the investment? When it does escalate its commitment, is 
there anything different ahout that investment from the ones it terminated? Past research 
indicates that clearly and strongly negative information results in project termination 
(Ross & Staw, 1993). Do these experienced VC firms need less clear and less strongly 
negative feedback than less experienced VC firms to terminate?
The next set of questions pertains to exactly what kinds of advice help the focal 
VC firm needs to recognize that it is funding a failing venture. When in the process is the 
focal VC firm most receptive to this advice? What signals from the venture trigger 
searching for this kind of advice? Does the position of the advice-giver in the network 
imply that this advice-giver is especially credible? What other factors give rise to the 
inference o f credibility? Does the timing of this advice affect the ultimate outcome? 
Clearly this research has just begun to scratch the surface of the kinds of questions that 
need to be asked to further the understanding of the role of the advice network in 
escalation of commitment. Finding answers would help VC firms make appropriate
134
decisions to bail from an investment early rather than escalate their commitment to a 
failing course of action.
Summary
This research investigated the advice networks of venture capital firms and 
whether network variables and VC firm demographic information influenced the 
tendency to escalate commitment to failing start-up companies. There were three major 
findings. The first finding was that the network of VC firms that invest in new high- 
technology start-up companies has become far more interconnected and dense over the 
last 15 or so years. It was not possible to identify regional hubs based on VC firm funding 
ties. The second finding was that these dense interconnections between VC firms allow 
information to flow freely throughout the network. Some of the network variables and 
characteristics of the VC firms within the advice network were significant predictors of 
escalation of commitment. The third finding was that determining the boundaries of a 
network and defining membership in that network affect the underlying network structure 
and thus the research results. The decision to delete network ties should be made with 
caution. Future research directions were suggested.
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